Public-private partnerships in South African healthcare provision: scholarship from the South by de Kock, Tarryn et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPPs in education and health in the Global South focusing 
on South Africa 
 
EQUIPPPs working paper 
June 2018 
 
 
Tarryn de Kock1, Nimi Hoffmann1,2, Yusuf Sayed1,3 and Robert van Niekerk2 
 
1
 Centre for International Teacher Education, Cape Peninsula University of Technology 
2
 Institute of Social and Economics Research, Rhodes University 
3
 Centre for International Education, University of Sussex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Situating the debate ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2.1. The Conceptual Roots of PPPs .............................................................................................. 5 
2.2. PPPs and social citizenship .................................................................................................... 7 
2.3. Defining PPPs ....................................................................................................................... 11 
3. PPPs in South African healthcare provision: scholarship from the global South ............... 13 
3.1. Situating the literature review ................................................................................................ 16 
3.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 20 
3.3. Mapping typologies of health PPPs ...................................................................................... 24 
3.4. Drivers of PPPs: factors and actors ...................................................................................... 31 
3.5. Main debates ......................................................................................................................... 37 
3.6. Conclusion: key knowledge gaps .......................................................................................... 45 
4. Literature review of education PPPs in the Global South focusing on South Africa .......... 54 
4.1. Situating the debates ............................................................................................................ 54 
4.2. PPPs: shifting private sector involvement from the ancillary and parallel to the core of a 
public education system .................................................................................................................... 58 
4.3. Public private partnerships in education: Definitions and typologies .................................... 60 
4.4. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 63 
4.5. Historicising privatisation in education in Africa and South Africa ........................................ 71 
4.6. Types of PPP ........................................................................................................................ 75 
4.7. Private schools ...................................................................................................................... 83 
4.8. Semi-private public schools .................................................................................................. 93 
4.9. Public-private partnerships .................................................................................................... 95 
4.10. Conclusion: Emerging analytical and research agendas ................................................ 101 
5. Concluding comments ............................................................................................................. 107 
6. Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 110 
6.1. Healthcare ........................................................................................................................... 110 
6.2. Education ............................................................................................................................ 121 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This literature review seeks to understand the key ideas and debates about Public 
Private partnerships (PPPs) in education and health, focusing on Africa in general 
and South Africa in particular. It adds to the sparse literature about the role of the 
private sector in education and health and what the implications are for social 
citizenship. The first section situates the debate by considering the genesis of the 
debate and the conceptual roots of the growing advocacy of the private sector as a 
key provider of social services. It then reviews the extant literature on health followed 
by that of education. The conclusion draws together some of the key themes 
emerging from the review. 
 
 
2. Situating the debate 
 
Private sector involvement in the provision of public goods is not a new 
phenomenon. Historically the private sector has always been involved in the 
provision of public goods, such as education. For example, missionary schools in 
colonial Africa can be considered as forms of private provision of a public good 
(where a public good is understood here as cost-free, state provided services as an 
entitlement of social citizenship). However, in the post-independence period, private 
sector involvement in education and health has been driven significantly by the 
increasing legitimation of market-based forms of provision in the management and 
delivery of public services in the mid-to-late 1970s in the global North. This was 
given impetus by the conservative economic reforms following the 1979 oil crisis. In 
that context, there was a strong ideological view that state provision of public goods 
such as education and healthcare resulted in producer capture, undermined 
consumer interest and contributed to a bloated state bureaucracy. This New Public 
Management, as it came to be known, advocated that users of healthcare and 
education should be understood as consumers who should have choice and control 
over these social services. Moreover, while the state may fund education or 
healthcare it does not have to provide the service. The idea of breaking up the 
perceived state monopoly of public goods was motivated by the idea that states 
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needed to become more efficient and effective in delivering public goods (Linder 
1999, Paoletto 2000).  
 
In Africa from the early 1960s until the late 1970s, as part of the decolonisation 
imperative states largely pursued an active social policy agenda which sought to 
discipline the market, and invested massively in public goods. This was driven by a 
view that the state should take control over public service provision for all to meet the 
development needs of the new states that emerged in this era. As such, public 
education and healthcare provision typically expanded dramatically during this 
period.  
 
It was only in the late 1980s that this approach began to shift to one of economic 
austerity and greater private sector provision as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Following the oil crisis and a series of droughts in the mid-1970s, African 
governments approached the IMF and World Bank for emergency financing, which 
was provided on condition that they implement a package of wide-ranging economic 
reforms known as “structural adjustment.” Between 1981 and 1989, 36 African 
countries had undergone at least one structural adjustment programme (Bujra 1994, 
132). These programmes typically included the removal of currency exchange 
controls, a substantial reduction in export and corporate taxes, the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises and the withdrawal of the state from the provision of public 
goods, including education and healthcare (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). By the 
end of the 1980s, many countries had a lower GDP per capita than at independence 
(Fosu, Mlambo, and Oshikoya 2001). The majority of industries that had been 
established in the post-independence period had collapsed and economies had 
reverted to their colonial specialisations (Mkandawire 1988c). External debt (often to 
former colonial powers) had grown to the extent that a number of countries were 
classified as insolvent, and were forced to allocate the majority of their budget to 
servicing debt (Elbadawi and Ndulu 1996).  
 
This period was accompanied by a substantial reduction in spending on public 
goods. For instance, of the 43 African countries that underwent adjustment between 
1980 and 2000, average government spending on education as a percentage of 
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GDP declined by 31% between 1978, the advent of the oil crisis and 1986, the height 
of adjustment. In contrast, during this period, the eight non-adjusted African 
countries increased their spending on education by an average of 19%. Figure 1 
below illustrates. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in government spending on education for adjusted versus non-adjusted African 
countries 
 
Source: Hoffmann (2017) 
 
This sharp reduction in social spending was accompanied by decreased access to 
healthcare and education, and increased illiteracy, mortality and malnutrition 
(Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 88). It was also accompanied by growing gender 
inequality. In the context of education, Stromquist (1999) demonstrates that between 
1988 and 1998 the gender gap in primary enrolment widened by 13 percentage 
points, while the primary school completion rates of girls also decreased relative to 
boys, where poor and rural girls disproportionately bore the brunt of adjustment. 
 
These deepening economic and social crises were in turn often accompanied by 
heightened political crises and civil conflict as structural adjustment programmes 
further eroded the legitimacy of the state (Campbell 1989; Mamdani 1990b; Wamba-
dia-Wamba 1992). By 1989, thirty-five of Africa’s forty-five independent states were 
under military rule (Mama 2006). As such, disentangling the causal impact of 
adjustment policies from the collapse in commodity prices and the rise in 
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authoritarianism during this period is a difficult task. This is especially difficult since 
these factors are likely endogenous. However, as Stromquist (1999) notes, panel 
analyses of adjustment in Latin America find that adjustment was correlated with a 
similarly large decline in education enrolment and completion rates, even though the 
region was not affected to the same extent by political and economic instability. This 
provides grounds for ascribing the negative education trends in Africa to adjustment 
programmes.  
 
Scholars have argued, however, that structural adjustment has not only shaped the 
material conditions of African societies, it has also shaped the very idea of the public 
good (Mustapha 2016). The decrease in public spending on social services was 
accompanied by a substantial increase in private spending on social services via the 
introduction of user fees (Mackintosh and Koivusalo 2005). This then laid the 
foundation for the idea that social services ought to be paid for by individual users. 
Thus, for instance, recent surveys of healthcare professionals across Africa find that 
many report that it is unfair and unsustainable for patients to access healthcare 
without paying user fees (Béland and Ridde 2016). This view of social services as a 
private investment rather than a public good in turn paves the way for the notion that 
social services are commodities that are best provided for by private actors (Ruiters, 
2012; Sengupta, 2012). 
 
There are several interrelated ideas that underpin the momentum and interest in 
private sector involvement in public goods globally and in Africa in particular. First 
they are seen as a mechanism to improve delivery of public services, which are seen 
to be inefficient and ineffective. The competition that derives from a system of 
parallel provision is perceived as a mechanism to drive up quality in public service 
provision. Competition then becomes the driver for engaging the private sector in 
public sector provision. Second, there is a strong view that the monopolisation of 
public sector provision by the state tends to crowd out private sector involvement in 
public services. As state resources become constrained, it is argued that there is a 
need to end the state monopoly in order to access resources from sources other 
than the state. In harnessing private sector financing it is assumed that the state may 
then be able to extend the coverage and quality of public services. Third, 
ontologically, state provision is seen as privileging producers (state civil 
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servants/state institutions) over beneficiaries (users/citizens). The needs of 
beneficiaries, it is argued, are best left to the market which better regulates what an 
individual needs, in contrast to a system of provision in which the needs are 
determined by the state. In ideological terms individuals are conceived as utility 
maximising and therefore best able to identify their needs and the private sector is 
viewed as the most optimal mechanism for meeting such needs. Fourth, it is 
perceived that the efficiency imperatives that drive the private sector result in driving 
down the unit cost for providing public goods in contrast again to state provision, 
which is seen as wasteful and expensive.  
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a more recent phenomenon in Africa when 
compared to private sector involvement in education and health. PPPs largely 
gained credibility in the late 1990s and early 2000s in these sectors along with the 
New Public Management movement. PPPs build on the assumption of efficiency 
gains and delivery effectiveness that underpins the general arguments advocated for 
private sector involvement in public service provision. However, the key difference is 
that instead of seeing these as distinct and in direct competition, there is a shift 
towards a middle ground which conceive of both sectors as working in collaboration 
and partnership rather than competition and mired in mutual antagonism. Thus, the 
unpalatable aspect of privatisation that characterised earlier debates (the 
marginalisation of the state in service provision), is supplanted by an idea of mutual 
benefit, harmony and joint working. This is the subject of this research project and 
this review of literature. 
 
 
2.1. The Conceptual Roots of PPPs 
 
The idea of partnership provision is rooted in certain assumptions. The first is the 
idea that public goods such as education and health are not ‘public’ as for example 
in the case of higher education which is argued to have a primarily ‘private’ utility for 
the individual. They are, as some economists suggest, subtractable and excludable. 
As such, they should not be provided by the state, but should rather be provided by 
the market or in partnership with the state. On this view, there are very few truly 
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public goods. As such this view challenges fundamental assumptions of what make 
education and health a public good. 
 
Second, there is a view that the interest of the state and the private sector are in 
alignment and not necessarily antagonistic when it comes to the provision of 
education and health. Thus PPPs assume that both the state and the private sector 
share a commitment to providing the best forms of education and health efficiently 
and effectively. Whilst the motivation for this alignment may differ (profit or rights), 
there is consensus in ensuring the best possible outcomes for public service 
provision in education and health. This common purpose thesis assumes a parity in 
power and interest. Partnerships are thus a pragmatic choice for parties that share a 
common purpose. 
 
Third, PPPs shift the discourse from the idea of parallel provision in which both the 
state and the private retain distinct spheres of operation to that in which this is 
overlapping and intersectional. The idea of competing or mutually reinforcing parallel 
provision is replaced with the idea of ‘working together’ which discursively shifts the 
debate about private sector involvement to one about the intersection between the 
public and private. This line of reasoning creates a pathway to privileging technical 
solutions to seemingly intractable problems in which the lines between public and 
private forms of provision are not only blurred but conceptually no longer taken as 
distinct. This line of reasoning furthermore displaces a common sphere of activity 
between state and private provision by a common purpose operational sphere in 
which questions of who delivers, how and when are rendered unimportant and 
insignificant. In such a conceptual move ideas of a public good as the primary 
responsibility of the state to provide are supplanted by the fuzzy notion of common 
purpose. The ontological presumption is that all goods are private and tradeable. 
  
Furthermore PPPs are presented as policy and programmatic ideas that address the 
negative connotation of privatisation in favour of a view of cooperation, collaboration 
and inclusivity for a common purpose. However as this review tries to demonstrate 
this is not the case. PPPs as policy and practice might undermine the idea of social 
citizenship which it is the duty of a democratic state, as the collective representative 
of all citizens, to protect. It furthermore represents private encroachment into public 
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resources and governance located within a modernising discursive and policy frame. 
This is discussed below with specific reference to education and health below. 
 
However, as this review demonstrates, there are conceptually significant differences 
between how the partnership between the state and the private sector operates in 
education in health. In South Africa the education system has been largely public 
and private educational provision has been subordinated to the system of public 
provision (in regards regulatory frameworks, school governing body policies, national 
examinations and so forth). In health, the fiscal provision has been overwhelmingly 
private sector dominated with the under-resourced public health care system acting 
in effect as a residual safety net for the poorest and most marginalised who cannot 
afford the costs associated with private health care.  
 
It is the relationship between cooperation and partnership in education and health– 
as a political strategy, an efficiency imperative, and for effectiveness that brings into 
question the role, value and moral good of PPPs. As they take on different forms in 
relation to context and type of project or services provided, the success of PPPs is 
directly related to how the relationship between cooperation and participation, and 
efficiency and resource management relate, and how management agreements deal 
responsibility with risk. These are the issues that this review considers. But first it 
pays attention to how private sector involvement in education and health in general 
and in the forms of PPP in particular shifts notions of citizenship.  
 
 
2.2. PPPs and social citizenship 
 
Fine and Hall (2012) suggest that the current drive towards privatisation is indicative 
of a new phase in market privileging ideas (neo-liberalism1). This advocates private 
                                            
1 
David Harvey defines neoliberalism as a political economy approach that assumes that collective 
wellbeing results from limiting state intervention in the market to only those acts which preserve its 
integrity as a free market. This includes creating an enabling environment for investment and 
expansion of the private sector, securing property rights and the functioning of the market to maximise 
profits (Harvey, 2005). Fundamentally, while definitions of neoliberalism vary, they generally conflate 
the preservation of individual liberty in the state with the liberty of corporations to act as legal citizens 
in the market. 
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expansion within the state rather than the eclipse of the state’s role. The 
consequence of this form of advocacy is that state resources are diverted towards 
partnership arrangements with private providers and creating the regulatory 
environment that ensures both efficiency and accountability (Fine & Hall, 2012). As 
the authors point out, this can prove to be more costly than public delivery because 
the state and the private sector have often opposing modes of value maximisation. 
While the state is expected to maximise public benefit in the delivery of goods, 
private providers may be accountable to shareholders, donors or even other 
governments who may have conflicting interests to that of the public good (Fine & 
Hall, 2012). In order to accommodate the private sector as part of its governance 
arrangements the state needs to reform to incorporate the frameworks, checks and 
balances that can safeguard accountability, good performance, and social benefit. 
 
The question which emerges is this: to whom are the state and private providers 
accountable? What needs attention is the impact on citizens, specifically how these 
privatising arrangements transform relations between state and society, and by 
implication, the expectations that citizens have of the state and their social rights to 
health, education and other state-provided public goods. The establishment of PPPs, 
the provision by non-state actors of a public good such as education and health, has 
particular consequences therefore for the exercise of the social rights of citizenship. 
As Awadalla (2003) argues, public provision of particular goods and services 
enables government to fulfil a range of social, economic and political aims and 
protect national interests. These aims and interests may come to be dispersed when 
public functions are outsourced to external actors. 
 
For social citizenship, the public good is guaranteed through ‘rights to economic 
security as well as [through] political and civil rights’ (McCluskey, 2002). This is 
intended to protect citizens from ‘the vicissitudes of capitalism’ (Mead, 1997). As 
Mead (following Marshall) (1997) argues, citizenship refers to the collection of rights 
and duties that citizens have which are protected by the state as a constitutional 
obligation and therefore are not discretionary. This is contested and conditioned by 
the ideological proclivities of governments but remains subject to negotiation with the 
citizens and their expectations of what characterises the ‘good society’. As such, as 
Mamdani (1997) posits, some members of a society are full citizens accorded rights 
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and entitlements, while others may occupy (a range of) subject positions depending 
on their structural location in the political order (based on race, class, gender and so 
forth). Within the context of market capitalism, social citizenship is most visibly 
identifiable in the welfare state, which offers a minimum level of security to citizens 
based on prevailing societal norms on what constitutes social inclusion (Mead, 1997; 
McCluskey, 2002). These social rights include healthcare and education, various 
remittances, public housing and/or public pension schemes. Social rights to 
citizenship are, however, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for inclusion in 
the welfare state as the welfare state historically has also been deeply racialised and 
gendered. Thus, for instance, the European welfare state has historically excluded 
black immigrants who have been viewed as ‘labour units’ rather than social citizens 
(Williams 1991, LKJ 2018). 
 
Marshall (1950) argues that the status granted by social citizenship does not 
transcend nor does it aim to transcend the inequalities of class in capitalist society. 
Rather it mediates the worst social effects such that it provides a sufficient basis for 
establishing social cohesion between citizens who still fundamentally hold unequal 
class differentiated positions in society – and social citizenship is therefore ultimately 
a status associated with the socially acceptable limits of inequality in a capitalist 
society. More significantly is the role accorded by Marshall to the state as the 
necessary arbiter ensuring that social rights are not subjected to the vagaries of the 
market, the locale of class differentiation. While state intervention is therefore part of 
the architecture of the welfare state, the market is driven by the assumption that self-
interest will secure social wellbeing (McCluskey 2002). Under this assumption, 
redistribution of resources through welfare support is viewed as inefficient because it 
not only diverges from the interests of the market but is also an intrusion on the 
rights of citizens to secure their individual interests through free exchange in the 
market and unfettered from state control and its circumscribing actions in the interest 
of the collective (Hayek 1944). This normative position on the market transforms 
social bonds making these bonds contingent on relationships established through a 
market based on the principle of competitive advantage and which a priori therefore 
cannot guarantee equal outcomes for those who participate as citizens do not enter 
the market exchange as equals but as competitors. The result is an ongoing tension 
between equity and efficiency that governs distribution of state resources in society.  
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Historically, this has resulted in shifts in social policy from post-war Keynesian 
welfare politics to the idea of the individual as a rational actor capable of making 
choices that maximise their wellbeing. What is not addressed here is how individual 
choices can set limitations on the choices of others and generate inequalities as the 
notion of a common good2 is eroded (McCluskey, 2002). There are thus particular 
limitations evident in how the state and the private sector work together. The de-
legitimation of entitlements to social citizenship not only residualises solutions to 
poverty but privileges policies aimed at inducing ‘work seeking’ behaviour (Mead, 
1997). Market interests therefore create pressure for changes in policies that reduce 
government’s role in the social sphere. Mechanisms such as contracting out in turn 
suggest maximisation in resource use through principles of efficiency but instead 
redirect resources to private interests. Private involvement in state delivery is not 
new, but where state facilities come to take on the principles of the private sector this 
can have particular influences on service delivery.  
 
Furthermore, it is expected that the principles of efficiency and discipline that 
characterise private firms can reduce risk by making government facilities function 
on market principles thus rendering them profitable and/or accountable to a 
consumer base. This creates a dilemma for the issue of schooling as a social good 
when learners become consumers accessing different standards of education on the 
basis of their economic bracket (Bloom, Craig & Mitchell, 2000). It also affects the 
stability and durability of drives to improve equity in education, such as through 
improving gender parity (Unterhalter & North, 2011) or increasing participation and 
ownership of schools by parents. Indeed, the particular governance arrangements 
within the state are an important factor enabling or constraining private interventions, 
whether negatively or positively. These are issues which are picked up in more detail 
in the literature review. 
 
 
                                            
2 
Here, the ‘common good’ refers to the good of society and all its members that enables individuals to 
achieve their own ends (Argandoña 1998). Definitions of the common good range from liberal to 
communitarian, emphasising either individuals’ right to choice or the common good having 
precedence over individual benefit. Here we suggest that the common good, or collective benefit, can 
be eroded as a sense of mutual responsibility between individuals is replaced by self-interest. 
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2.3. Defining PPPs 
 
The forms of private sector involvement in education and health is a subject of much 
contestation and debate. PPPs as a manifestation of private sector involvement in 
public goods are based on a partnership ordinarily taking the form of a ‘a contract 
that a government makes with a private service provider to acquire a specified 
service of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price for a specified period.’ 
(Taylor 2003, quoted in Patrinos, Barrero-Osorio & Guáqueta, 2009). The often 
publicly stated rationale is to ‘… provide direct investment by the private sector as an 
alternative to public finance, thus reducing the need for public finance through 
increased government debt.’ (Fine and Hall 2012:56) The common interest thesis 
which is often the publically stated rationale suggests an intersection of interest 
between the state and private sector blurring the idea of what is considered public 
and private which in reality do not exist. Whilst PPPs are contextually specific it is 
possible to conceive of six types of PPPs characterised by their organisational mix 
and political framing (Linder 1999).  
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Linder (1999) argues that these styles or strategies can overlap in varying ways, but 
do not account for other ways in which partnerships come to form around social or 
communal needs. The typology of Linder, whilst dated, provides a heuristic 
framework for understanding the different types of PPPs and offers a way of thinking 
through whether the publically stated rationale of PPPs materialises in practice.  
 
It is important also in defining PPPs to consider what is meant by the private sector. 
There are a variety of organisations and actors involved in education and health. 
They encompass NGOs, management firms, corporate social investment branches 
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of corporations, philanthropic organisations and education and health conglomerates 
and service providers.  
 
Key to the emergence of PPPs is the changing role of the state. The state is 
expected to not only create an enabling environment for private sector involvement 
in partnerships but also to have the capacity to regulate the partnerships that merge. 
In this review we pay attention to these aspects to better understand the 
mechanisms of PPP agreements and their implications for public responsibility and 
expenditure. 
 
A key empirical question is whether PPPs realise the benefits that are advocated by 
institutions such as the World Bank. These include:  
 Stimulate competitiveness between providers or contractors 
 Be more flexible contractually than purely state-run entities (including 
sidestepping legislation or policy affecting these entities) 
 Be held to an improved standard of accountability through open and 
transparent bidding processes where government can identify the 
contractual obligations and outcomes of the private provider, as well as 
find providers that fit the budget 
 Increase risk-sharing between government and private providers, with the 
potential for improved efficiency and freeing up of more resources 
(Patrinos, Barrero-Osorio & Guáqueta 2009) 
 
Part of the difficulty of assessing the empirical evidence about the imputed benefits 
is that often the detail is in the contract, which are often confidential and which states 
are reluctant to reveal. In South Africa, for example, despite efforts we were unable 
to secure details of the PPPs contract for education and health. This suggests that 
rigorous empirical reviews of PPPs and their contractual underpinning are limited by 
the lack of transparency. 
 
3. PPPs in South African healthcare provision: scholarship 
from the global South 
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Since 2004 there has been a rapid growth in the value of public private partnerships 
(PPPs) in the global South.3 Over an eight-year period, it is estimated that 
investments in infrastructure through PPPs increased by a factor of six across the 
global South, from approximately US$25 billion to US$164 billion (Romero 2015). 
While there are some signs that PPPs in both the construction of healthcare 
infrastructure and the provision of healthcare services are growing across the global 
South, comparatively little is known about their scale, their causes or consequences, 
particularly within Africa. 
 
This review aims to identify the key knowledge gaps in health PPPs in Africa, with 
special reference to South Africa. To do so, it builds on a recent review of literature 
on PPPs in education and health in the global South conducted by Languille (2017). 
Languille’s wide-ranging narrative review of 217 documents provides an excellent 
overview of broader trends across the global South. However, with the exception of 
two articles cited in the review, PPPs in South Africa remain under-explored. 
Moreover, Languille’s review is largely focused on scholarship emanating from the 
global North. Indeed, a number of literature reviews on PPPs in the South focus 
overwhelmingly on northern scholarship (Hanefeld 2008; Biesma et al. 2009; Brody 
et al. 2013; Torchia, Calabrò, and Morner 2015).  
 
This likely reflects well-documented regional inequalities in scholarly influence 
(Boshoff 2009; Schubert and Sooryamoorthy 2010; Lancho Barrantes et al. 2012; 
Zelnio 2012; Mazloumian et al. 2013). Yet such inequality has significant 
hermeneutical implications in terms of the categories and concepts which are used 
to understand phenomena in the global South. As Mazloumian et al. (2013) 
demonstrate in their analysis of global knowledge flows using network-based citation 
analysis, scholars in the South overwhelmingly rely on scholarship from the North, 
while scholars in the North draw very little on scholarship from the South; the 
cumulative impact of this is that “dependence on knowledge produced in North 
                                            
3  
Following Connell (2007)(2007)(2007), the term global South is used to mean former 
colonies in Africa, Asia and the Americas (excluding the United States and Canada). The term global 
North is used to designate former colonial powers and their outposts, as well as current hegemons. 
Thus, for instance, Australia, Belgium and the United States are all located in the global North. 
Countries from the former Soviet Union do not easily fit into either category; however, no authors from 
these countries were cited in the study and the problem of categorisation therefore did not arise.  
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America and Europe has increased [between 2000-2009]” (Mazloumian et al. 2013, 
3–4). As a consequence, they argue, ideas are largely born in the North but 
consumed in the South.  
 
It is within this context that this review examines southern literature on PPPs in 
healthcare, focusing especially on South Africa. It is guided by a central question: 
how does southern scholarship on health PPPs accord with, or depart from, northern 
literature on the topic? As a way of answering this question, this review begins with a 
bibliometric analysis of the institutional location of authors cited in Languille (2017). 
In light of this, it sets out a methodology for searching academic databases and 
journals located in the global South. It then structures the analysis of the literature 
according to the sections identified by Languille. These sections are: a typology of 
PPPs; drivers of PPPs; and main debates on PPPs, including contestations over the 
PPP paradigm, the reconfiguration of state-market relations, the outcomes of PPPs, 
and the nature of evidence on PPPs. Each section first presents a brief overview of 
Languille’s findings, and then analyses the extent to which southern literature 
accords with, or departs from, these findings. The review concludes by considering 
how the analysis of southern literature casts light on further avenues for theoretical 
and empirical research on the topic.  
 
Overall, the review finds that there are three critical knowledge gaps. First, relatively 
little is known about the endogenous dynamics of PPPs in the global South. This 
includes their financial scale and drivers, in terms of both for-profit and non-profit 
entities, as well as the implications of health PPPs for public health financing and 
national debt. Second, there is insufficient information about the ways in which 
endogenous drivers interact with more global dynamics. These global dynamics do 
not only include the influence of international entities controlled by northern actors, 
but also the expansion of southern healthcare companies into the global North. 
Paying attention to the interplay between local and global dynamics allows for an 
exploration of the ways in which PPPs constitute a laboratory for experimenting with 
new forms of state-market relations across both the global South and North, and the 
dynamics and consequences of this. In the South African context, it also allows for 
an examination of the ways in which state support for the rapid expansion of South 
African companies into other markets, such as Netcare and Medi-Clinic, constitutes 
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a de facto form of industrial policy. Understanding why this form of industrial policy 
has succeeded in enabling the expansion of an infant industry, vis-à-vis the failure of 
industrial policy targeting original equipment manufacturing, is an important and 
hitherto unexplored empirical project. 
 
Third, while PPPs are typically conceptualised as an attempt to bring the logic of the 
market into public goods provision, there are clear examples of PPPs that have a 
countervailing logic. The proposed National Health Insurance (NHI) scheme in South 
Africa aims to decommodify healthcare by bringing the private sector back into the 
ambit of the public. The existential risk that this poses to the private health sector 
has catalysed significant contestation over the NHI, and it is therefore important to 
understand the ways in which the NHI has structured tensions between the state and 
the private sector, the mechanisms available for disciplining the private sector, and 
the constraints on the state’s attempt to do so. 
 
These findings show that there is empirical and theoretical value in paying serious 
attention to southern scholarship on PPPs. On the one hand, it helps to remove 
some of the strong normative framing around PPPs, by showing that they may be 
used to deepen the marketisation of public goods, but can also be used for 
countervailing ends – the decommodification of healthcare. It also shows how some 
health PPPs can be understood as a form of industrial policy, such that the study of 
state subsidies to private healthcare sector could generate useful insights into 
industrial policy strategies to support industries that may have less deleterious social 
outcomes, such as the renewable energy sector. At the same time, the review brings 
theoretical and empirical attention to the endogenous drivers of PPPs, and thereby 
helps reframe the discourse away from an over-emphasis on northern agency to 
include southern dynamics. It is hoped that this helps galvanise greater attention to 
southern scholarship. 
 
 
3.1. Situating the literature review 
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This section sets out the bibliometric analysis of the institutional location of authors 
cited in Languille (2017). Institutional location is a fairly accurate indicator of the level 
of scholarly influence of institutions and the countries they are located in. It is a less 
accurate indicator of racial and geopolitical divisions in knowledge production, since 
the movement of scholars means that, for instance, a black Nigerian scholar located 
in a British university is coded as contributing to British scholarship. Put differently, 
institutional inequalities in knowledge production do not fully coincide with identity 
inequalities, such as race, nationality and gender. 
 
The institutional location of authors was identified using the authors’ stated 
institutional affiliation in the journal article, book, conference paper or monograph. 
Where no institutional affiliation was given, a Google search of an author’s most 
recent institutional location was used. Of the 143 items cited in the literature review, 
there were a total of 321 authors (including co-authors), and 143 first authors. Five 
authors in the literature review were unaffiliated to any institution and were coded as 
such. United Nations agencies and the World Bank were not given a country 
designation, but retained their status as international agencies. However, national 
development agencies with offices in many countries were assigned their home 
country. Similarly, non-governmental organisations and multinational firms with 
offices in multiple countries were assigned the country of their head office. Authors 
located in the United States and Canada were coded as “North America,” while 
Mexico was coded as “South America,” in order to facilitate an easy aggregation into 
the broader regional categories of global North and global South. Australia and New 
Zealand were similarly coded as being in the global North.  
 
The bibliometric analysis of the institutional location of authors cited in Languille 
(2017) indicates that the review is skewed towards authors located in the global 
North. Authors in the United States and the United Kingdom dominate the literature 
review, contributing 27% and 33% of the articles respectively, or a total of 60% (see 
Figure 2 below). At a regional level, authors located in the global North contribute 
82% of the articles, while those in the global South contribute to just 12% of the 
articles, and international institutions contribute the remaining 6% (see Figure 3 
below).  
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Figure 2: The country location of all authors 
 
 
Figure 3: All authors located in the global South 
 
 
This picture becomes starker when one considers first authors, where first 
authorship plausibly indicates who sets the agenda of the article, in terms of 
empirical and theoretical preoccupations. First authors in the global South contribute 
to just 3% of articles, the same proportion as authors from just one international 
institution – the World Bank (see Figure 4 below). In contrast, first authors in the 
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global North contribute to 92% of the articles. Significantly, there are no first authors 
located in African institutions (see Figure 5 below). 
 
Figure 4: First authors located in the global South 
 
 
Figure 5: The regional location of first authors 
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Thus, while Languille (2017) provides an incisive overview of recent northern 
scholarship on public private partnerships in the global South, there is a need to 
understand how authors in the global South, and in Africa more particularly, have 
studied the dynamics and consequences of PPPs in the region, as this will provide a 
more holistic understanding of current scholarship in the area.  
 
Within this context, this review focuses on PPPs in health in South Africa, with the 
aim of identifying the extent to which scholarship in the South accords with, or 
departs from, the main themes and perspectives identified in Languille (2017). The 
intention is to identify work that deepens and broadens extant empirical and 
theoretical literature from the global North. 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Languille’s (2017) literature review is drawn from a search of three academic 
databases: JSTOR, ERIC and PubMed, and catalogues of “key journals”: IJED, 
Compare, Comparative education, Social Science and Medicine, and Global Social 
Policy. However, these academic databases are overwhelmingly dominated by 
journals published in the global North, particularly in the United States and United 
Kingdom (Bakuwa 2014; Nwagwu 2010), while all of the journals listed in the review 
are located in the global North. A recent bibliometric analysis of high impact northern 
journals dealing with African economies finds that these journals overwhelmingly 
publish northern-based scholars and their editorial boards are dominated by scholars 
in the United States and United Kingdom (Chelwa 2016).  
 
This review therefore supplements these sources, by drawing on academic 
databases that curate journals published in the global South, including African 
Journals Online (AJOL), South America’s Scientific Electronic Library Online 
(SciELO), and Asia Journals Online (AsiaJOL). In addition, it draws on a specialised 
database on healthcare in Southern Africa – the Regional Network for Equity in 
Health in East and Southern Africa (EQUINET), focusing on items indexed in its 
“public private mix” section. It also draws on two academic databases that specialise 
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in publishing South African journals – Sabinet and the National Inquiry Services 
Centre (NISC). It further draws on key journals and books published in Africa. This 
includes the stable of journals and books published by the Council for the 
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), including Africa 
Development and African Sociological Review, and journals published in South 
Africa, including the South African Medical Journal, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, and New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy. 
Importantly, these journals do not exclusively contain southern literature. However 
they tend to include a larger proportion of southern scholars relative to northern 
journals, and the inclusion of southern scholars on their editorial boards suggests 
that these journals are more likely to publish literature that speaks to the concerns of 
southern intellectual communities. 
 
Languille (2017, 3) notes that there are multiple terms used to describe the role of 
PPPs in social policy. She argues that this is because the health and education 
literature has a broader conception of PPPs than that of the more established 
literature on infrastructure PPPs, which largely considers this to be a narrow 
contractual relationship between a public and a private entitity, defined by a long-
term horizon and the sharing of risks and costs between the two parties. As such, 
Languille’s search items included not only the term ‘public private partnership’, but 
also public-private initiative’, ‘public-private interaction’, ‘contracting out’, and 
‘demand side financing’.  
 
However, this literature review takes a more narrow view of public private 
partnerships on the basis of the empirical typology developed by Whyle and Olivier 
(2016). Drawing on 68 case studies of different forms of public private engagement 
across Southern Africa, they develop a typology of different forms of private 
engagement in public healthcare depending on whether the engagement is 
contractual, the length of the engagement, and the ways in which risk-sharing, 
decision-making responsibility, and power are shared between state and non-state 
entities (see Figure 6 below). On the basis of this typology, a public private 
partnership in healthcare is defined by a contract between a state and non-state 
actor, which involves the sharing of risks and decision-making over a long-term 
horizon, where non-state actors are comprised of for-profit companies, not-for-profit 
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entities, and non-governmental organisations. This definition of a PPP includes 
arrangements for contracting non-state actors to build, finance and/or operate public 
healthcare facilities, as well as arrangements for contracting non-state actors to use 
public healthcare facilities in exchange for payments in goods, services or fees. It 
excludes the use of any short-term and/or non-contractual arrangements between 
state and non-state actors, such as the use of non-state actors to market public 
health information or provide short-term services and goods to the public health 
sector.  
 
Figure 6: Models of Public-Private Engagement in Southern Africa 
 
Source: Whyle and Olivier (2016, 5) 
 
Long-term, contractual risk-sharing arrangements have distinctive implications for 
public debt. Under this arrangement, for instance, instead of the state providing 
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upfront capital to build a hospital, the PPP uses annual instalments from revenue 
budgets or user fees to pay the private sector for building the hospital. This 
arrangement therefore represents a form of public borrowing, where the difference in 
the timing of the cash flow obscures the true long-term cost of the debt (Romero 
2015). As such, a more narrow definition of health PPPs is useful for investigating 
the drivers and outcomes of these hidden forms of public debt. However, Whyle and 
Olivier’s (2016) empirical typology makes the useful analytical point that public 
private partnerships exist within a broader landscape of public private engagement. 
Consequently, while this review focuses on the more narrow definition of PPPs, it is 
nevertheless located within an understanding of the wider dynamics of public private 
engagement. 
 
Despite the differences in the definition of health PPPs between Languille (2017) and 
Whyle and Olivier (2016), both reviews recognise that the term “public private 
partnership” may not always be used in the literature to characterise PPPs. As a 
consequence, this literature review uses Languille’s more expansive list of search 
terms. It adds to this list the terms ‘NPOs and healthcare’, ‘NGOs and healthcare’, 
and ‘financialisation of public goods.’ This reflects current debates on the role of non-
state actors in public goods provision in South Africa, which draw attention to the 
ways in which non-governmental and non-profit organisations may have a similar 
institutional function to for-profit firms. 
 
Languille (2017, 2) focuses on articles published since 2000, when PPPs came to be 
viewed as important policy instruments for the global South by international financial 
organisations and international organisations, such as the World Bank and the World 
Health Organisation. However, the relatively smaller body of literature published in 
the South means that this literature search did not need be defined by a short time 
horizon, and the search therefore did not take into account the year of publication. 
This also enabled an examination of literature before the advent of formally defined 
health PPPs, which allowed for an analysis of theoretical work on the underlying 
causes of PPPs. 
 
Once the first sift had been conducted and a draft review of the literature had been 
developed, the review was submitted to a senior health policy scholar for expert 
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review, who then identified key publications that were missing from the literature 
review. Additional articles were identified through snowballing from articles which 
cited these key publications. Table 1 below presents the inclusion criteria used in 
Languille (2017) and this review. 
 
Table 1: Criteria for inclusion 
Criteria Languille (2017) This review (2018) 
Publication: date 2000-2017 Any date 
Publication: type Academic journals and books; 
minimal grey literature 
Academic journals and books; no 
grey literature 
Publication: location Global North (implicit) Global South (explicit) 
Content: thematic focus PPPs in health and education PPPs in health 
Content: geographic 
focus 
Global South Africa, with a focus on South Africa 
Search: terms used public private partnership 
public-private initiative 
public-private interaction 
public private collaboration 
multi-stakeholders partnerships 
contracting out  
private finance initiative  
demand-side financing 
charter schools 
voucher 
public private partnership 
public-private initiative 
public-private interaction 
public private collaboration 
multi-stakeholders partnerships 
contracting out  
private finance initiative  
demand-side financing 
NPOs and healthcare 
NGOs and healthcare 
financialisation of public goods 
Search: academic 
databases 
JSTOR 
ERIC 
PubMed 
Regional Network for Equity in 
Health in East and Southern Africa 
(EQUINET) 
African Journals Online (AJOL) 
Scientific Electronic Library Online 
(SciELO) 
Asia Journals Online (AsiaJOL) 
Sabinet 
National Inquiry Services Centre 
(NISC) 
Search: key journals IJED 
Compare 
Comparative education 
Social Science and Medicine 
Global Social Policy 
Africa Development 
African Sociological Review 
South African Medical Journal 
Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 
New Agenda: South African Journal 
of Social and Economic Policy 
 
 
3.3. Mapping typologies of health PPPs 
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Languille’s (2017) review identifies three main types of PPPs in northern literature on 
the topic. The first strand of literature concerns global health initiatives, which have 
received fairly extensive scholarly treatment, especially regarding the funding and 
development of vaccines and drugs. The second strand focuses on in-country 
arrangements for the construction and maintenance of health facilities, as well as the 
delivery of health services and related non-clinical services. Here, Languille notes 
that there is some scholarship on South Africa’s experience in contracting out 
primary care services (Mills et al., 2004; Palmer & Mills, 2005). The third strand 
concerns “demand-side financing schemes”, or vouchers, that subsidise users to 
purchase services from accredited providers. As discussed above, the use of 
vouchers does not satisfy the narrow definition of public private partnerships, and is 
therefore not discussed in this review.  
 
However, Whyle and Olivier’s (2016) review of literature on the topic in Southern 
Africa nuances the in-country arrangements for the delivery of health services. They 
develop an empirical disaggregation of in-country PPPs by examining the different 
forms of financing, operation models, services provided, and benefits to state and 
non-state actors (see Table 2 below).  
 
Table 2: Different PPP models 
Private Finance 
Initiative or 
(DBFO) 
Public-Private 
Integrated 
Partnership 
Alzira Model Franchise Co-location 
Public-Private 
Partnership 
Long-term 
contract in which 
the design, 
building financing 
and non-clinical 
operation of a 
facility, in 
accordance with 
public authority 
requirements, is 
contracted to a 
private 
consortium. 
Long-term 
partnership 
between the state 
and a private 
consortium, in 
which contracted 
services include 
infrastructure, 
non-clinical 
operations and 
clinical 
operations 
delivered to a 
specified 
segment of the 
population. 
A contractual 
arrangement that 
combines the 
building of 
facilities with the 
operating of non-
clinical services 
and clinical 
services including 
primary care 
provision for a 
defined 
population in 
return for 
capitated 
payment. 
The public 
authority uses 
contracting 
arrangements to 
harmonise the 
activities of a 
network of 
providers, 
supporting the 
providers through 
branding and 
bulk drug 
purchasing, while 
strictly controlling 
the quality, 
quantity and 
package of 
services provided 
and disallowing 
cream-skimming. 
A long-term 
partnership 
through which a 
portion of a public 
hospital's 
premise is 
granted for use 
by a private 
provider, sharing 
infrastructure and 
support services 
but operating as 
distinct facilities, 
in return for 
payment and 
specified benefits 
to the public 
party. 
Key characteristics 
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Utilises private 
financing 
Utilises private 
financing 
Utilises private 
financing 
Network 
approach 
Shared premises 
Includes 
upgrading/building 
and non-clinical 
facility 
management 
Includes clinical 
(tertiary) and 
non-clinical 
facility 
management 
Includes clinical 
(all levels) and 
non-clinical 
facility 
management 
Resource sharing 
from public to 
private partner 
Payment from 
private to public 
partner 
3-way subcontract 
structure (finance, 
build/procure, 
manage) 
Contract 
specifying quality, 
quantity and 
outcomes 
Capitated 
payment 
mechanism 
Strict control of 
quality, quantity 
and type of 
services 
No private 
provision of 
services on 
behalf of public 
sector 
Source: Whyle and Olivier (2016) 
 
The Alzira Model has received perhaps the greatest public attention in the form of 
Lesotho’s Queen Mamohato Memorial Hospital. This is an 18-year contractual 
arrangement for a private consortium, led by the South African company Netcare, to 
build the facilities and provide both non-clinical and clinical services to a defined 
number of patients. In return, the government pays an annual unitary fee that covers 
capital repayment and service delivery costs (capitated payments). This was 
presented as a flagship PPP model by the International Financial Corporation (IFC), 
but has been subjected to extensive criticism (McIntyre 2010; Doherty 2011; Marriott 
2014; Hildyard 2014). This criticism has largely focused on the implications for the 
national budget, drawing attention to the generous 25% return on equity for PPP 
shareholders and a total projected cash income 7.6 times higher than the original 
investment. The result is that the hospital has cost more than three times what a 
public hospital would cost, and consumes more than 51% of the public health 
budget. This has led to an increase in public debt, such that the government has 
reduced its public health budget.  
 
However, Whyle and Olivier (2016) do not find any other examples of the Alzira 
model in their literature review. Instead, the majority of in-country arrangements 
studied in Southern Africa concern co-location PPPs. All of the studied co-location 
PPPs focused on South Africa, where a growing number of tertiary public hospitals 
are sharing premises with private providers. Netcare, for instance, currently has five 
co-location hospitals in its portfolio (Netcare Group 2017), and at least one other co-
location hospital through its majority shareholding in the Community Health Group 
(Netcare Group 2015). The co-location model operates on the basis of economic 
segregation, where wealthier patients pay to use the private facility, and poor 
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patients access the public facility. Given the ways in which race and class continue 
to coincide in South Africa, it is plausible that this co-location model reproduces 
forms of segregation that have strong continuities with apartheid healthcare. The 
dynamics and consequences of this appear to be unstudied in the literature. 
 
In addition to these sub-types, a review of literature focused on South Africa provides 
three other sub-types of in-country arrangements. The first sub-type concerns the 
state contracting out services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and non-
profit organisations (NPOs), rather than for-profit companies. A recent example of 
this discussed in the literature is the case of Life Esidemini, where the Gauteng 
Department of Health in South Africa outsourced mental health services to ‘fly-by-
night’ NGOs, which were not licensed to provide services, as a consequence of 
which 143 patients died of neglect (Lund 2016; Govender 2017; Stein et al. 2017; 
Dhai 2017; Farham 2017). This literature indicates that, while NGOs and NPOs have 
a legal standing that is distinct from for-profit companies, they may nevertheless 
approximate their operating model and function in two respects. First, they may be 
driven by the ethos of personal gain rather than public service. Second, they share a 
similar institutional logic, insofar as NGOs and for-profits are not in the first instance 
accountable to citizens, but are rather primarily accountable to funders and investors 
respectively. As Baru and Mundy (2008) demonstrate in their historical analysis of 
the evolution of PPPs in Indian healthcare over the last six decades, NGOs have 
increasingly played a mediating role in such arrangements, which are characterised 
by an overall lack of accountability to citizens on the part of both for-profits and 
NGOs. As a consequence, there is evidence that there has often been a blurring of 
roles between NGOs and for-profits across the global South (Kapilashrami and 
O’Brien 2012). Furthermore, a body of literature explores the ways in which the 
complex entanglement between state and non-state actors in the context of 
contractual arrangements that minimise accountability for non-state actors 
significantly fragments the state and weakens its power (Hassim 2008; Adésínà 
2009; Lund 2016). 
 
The second sub-type concerns the role of international donors in outsourcing the 
provision of public healthcare to NGOs and NPOs. This appears to be the most 
common – and complex – form of in-country arrangement for outsourcing public 
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healthcare to NGOs and NPOs. It occurs when donor funding is made conditional on 
the funding flowing through the state to NGOs and NPOs, such that the PPP comes 
to be defined by three actors – the state, the NGO/NPO, and the international donor. 
In the South African context, 98% of health expenditure is derived from state and 
local private spending and just over 2% is derived from external sources. 
Nevertheless, donor funding seems to have had an outsized impact on the 
outsourcing of public HIV/Aids and tuberculosis treatment to non-state actors. In 
2009, external sources made up 16.4% of all HIV/Aids and tuberculosis spending in 
South Africa (Koch and Weingart 2016). This figure is considerably smaller than 
donor funding for other Southern African countries, where up to 80% of all health 
programmes are funded from outside (Whyle and Olivier 2016). Yet, the institutional 
consequences of such funding recently became manifest when the two largest 
external financiers of healthcare provision in South Africa – the United States 
through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) – cut their 
contributions. Since 2004, the PEPFAR programme has channelled nearly $4 billion 
to South Africa (Kavanagh 2014 cited in Koch and Weingart 2016). The majority of 
resources were allocated to NGOs offering direct services for patients in need of 
antiretroviral drugs. Since the United States ceased funding, many specialised HIV 
treatment centres have been forced to close (Biesma et al. 2009; Parsons, Mathole, 
and Sanders 2010) and the state has struggled to absorb patients and staff into an 
underfunded public health system (Koch and Weingart 2016). Thus, despite the 
limited volume of donor funding in relation to South African resources, donor funding 
has a demonstrable capacity to fundamentally shape the institutional landscape of 
public health provision.  
 
Donors’ capacity to reshape health institutions is particularly important in the rest of 
Southern Africa, which is far more heavily reliant on donor funding for healthcare. A 
review of seven case studies of global health initiatives in the region indicates that 
these initiatives frequently bypass and thereby undermine government health plans 
and priorities, and tend to be defined by a lack of financial transparency, an absence 
of accountability to state actors and low levels of sustainability (Whyle and Olivier 
2016). A similar in-depth case study of Global Health Initiatives across seven 
countries in Europe, Asia and Africa found that they bypassed coordination 
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mechanisms, thereby weakening national governance mechanisms (Spicer et al. 
2010). It appears that there is as of yet no case study which examines the 
mechanisms for improving international donors’ accountability to national states or 
ensuring that donor programmes do not have a destabilising effect on public health 
systems. 
 
A third sub-type of PPP in the literature concerns the proposed National Health 
Insurance (NHI) scheme in South Africa in the context of inequitable expenditure on 
health. In 2016, the Department of Health (2017a, 42) estimated that medical aid 
members, including state employees, received R20 billion in tax credits from the 
state as well as a direct subsidy of R18.5 billion through the state’s contribution to 
the Government Employee’s Medical Scheme, which employees use to purchase 
health services from private providers. In contrast, government allocated R190.7 
billion to public health expenditure. These subsidies to the private sector therefore 
represent a loss of almost 20% of potential government spending on public health. 
This excluded the substantial payments made to private healthcare providers as 
government contracts out and in various services, which amounted to at least 10% of 
hospital budgets in 1999, where this has likely increased substantially in the 
intervening years (Dambisya, Modipa, and others 2009). In addition, private 
spending on healthcare in 2016 amounted to R198.4 billion, which represents more 
than half of all spending on healthcare in the country. Much of the scholarship in this 
area emphasises that the private sector services only 15% of the population, as a 
consequence of which a minority of the population (who are overwhelmingly white) 
receives a disproportionate share of public and private investment in health (Bond, 
Pillay, and Sanders 1997; Chopra et al. 2009; Dambisya, Modipa, and others 2009; 
McIntyre 2010; Schaay et al. 2011; du Plessis 2013; Marten et al. 2014). An 
indication of this is that approximately 80% of doctors in the country service just 15% 
of the population (Gonzalez 2017). In this context, the Department of Health 
envisioned that the proposed NHI would replace multiple private health insurance 
schemes with a single mandatory national health insurance scheme controlled and 
owned by the state, which would purchase healthcare services on behalf of the 
entire population from both public and private providers (Department of Health 
2017a, 1). To do so, the state would end the system of tax credits to private health 
insurance companies and introduce NHI-specific taxes, while subjecting private 
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providers to long-term contracts specifying the maximum rate of payment for health 
services (Gonzalez 2017).  
 
While the literature notes that the NHI represents a long-term “contracting-in” of 
private sector medical professional into the state (McIntyre 2010; Surender, Van 
Niekerk, and Alfers 2016), and is therefore a public-private partnership, the majority 
of literature on the NHI is focused on its feasibility. This includes issues of financial 
feasibility (Claasen 2012; Hongoro 2012; McIntyre 2012), human resource 
constraints (Matsoso and Fryatt 2013; Lloyd, Sanders, and Lehmann 2010), supplier 
constraints (Ward et al. 2014) and administrative feasibility (van Niekerk 2012; 
Magadzire et al. 2017), as well as the extent of support for the NHI. In this respect, a 
growing body of empirical work seeks to elicit the perceptions, experiences and 
values of potential users of the NHI (Shisana et al. 2006; McIntyre et al. 2009; 
Weimann and Stuttaford 2014) as well as medical practitioners in and out of NHI 
pilots (Moosa et al. 2016; Surender, Van Niekerk, and Alfers 2016; Béland and 
Ridde 2016). A small body of literature also reviews the policy positions of various 
key actors in the NHI, such as political parties, medical schemes and trade unions 
(McIntyre 2010; von Holdt 2014; Rispel 2016; van Niekerk 2016).  
 
A key gap in this literature then, is an exploration of the logic of the NHI as a PPP 
arrangement that seeks to (re)introduce the public into the private, rather than 
bringing the private into the public, and the ways in which this structures tensions 
between state and non-state actors and shapes broader social understandings of 
healthcare as a public good. Put differently, while PPPs have largely been analysed 
as attempts to bring the characteristics of the private sector into the public sector – 
what Mackintosh (2006) calls marketisation – PPPs can have the opposite logic – 
that of attempting to decommodify private healthcare. 
 
This is a critical epistemic gap, since shortly after gazetting the White Paper on the 
NHI in 2017, the Department of Health (2017b) issued a gazette for implementation 
structures which would be dominated by private sector interests, and where the 
terms of reference abandon the principle of a single-payer single-tier health system 
in favour of a multiple-payer system defined by differentiated access to quality health 
care. In light of this about turn, the People’s Health Movement argued that intense 
31 
 
private sector lobbying had allowed corporate capture of the NHI for private interests 
(Reynolds 2017). While the implementation of the NHI is likely to be a site of ongoing 
contestations, research on the political economy of this PPP-driven health reform not 
only has political value in the short-medium term in South Africa, but may also 
generate useful empirical insights for countries seeking to implement similar reforms 
in the future.  
 
Within this context, the mechanisms for disciplining the private sector and the 
constraints on the state’s attempts to do so are key areas for research. Disciplinary 
mechanisms typically include the mechanisms of state regulation, such as state 
legislation, national policies, and regulatory structures. This area of research remains 
under-developed, with the exception of Doherty’s (2015) policy review of health 
legislation across Southern and East Africa, which examines the range and 
limitations of existing legislation, identifies major implementation and enforcement 
problems and suggests strategies that Ministries of Health in the region could adopt 
to regulate the private sector more effectively and in line with key public health 
objectives. Yet, as Doherty stresses, there is very little empirical research on the 
power of the private health sector to undermine efforts for increased regulation, and 
as such, the political economy of state regulation remains underexplored.  
 
In addition to state regulation, disciplinary mechanisms can also include financial 
mechanisms available to the state, such as the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), 
which is the single largest South African investor on the JSE and a major investor in 
private healthcare providers such as Netcare. The PIC has the capacity, through its 
sheer financial size, choice of investments and shareholder activism, to shape not 
only the ownership and management structures of businesses, but also their core 
objectives. As Hendricks (2014) argues, questions as to how the PIC might discipline 
these firms, and why it has not done so remain unanswered in the empirical 
literature.  
 
 
3.4. Drivers of PPPs: factors and actors 
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Languille’s (2017) review indicates that the drivers of PPPs in healthcare and 
education have largely been analysed in northern literature through the lens of 
neoliberal globalisation, both as an international ideological development and 
through its main institutional vectors, such as the World Bank and 
philanthrocapitalists. As such, three categories of actors have been subject to 
specific analyses: international financial institutions, philanthropic organisations and 
private companies. However, Languille emphasises that, while private companies 
are key actors in PPP provision, very little is known about them, their incentives and 
their actual benefits. In this respect, this review finds that there is also some grey 
literature examining the role of international development agencies, such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development, in driving and financing health PPPs in 
the global South (Marriott 2014; Transnational Institute 2017; Jubilee Debt Campaign 
2017). 
 
In addition, Languille briefly notes that literature on global health initiatives has also 
invoked problems regarding intellectual property rights in relation to global 
pandemics such HIV/Aids. However, this literature is located in a nascent tradition 
that identifies complex and expensive intellectual property rights regimes as a barrier 
to the open sharing of knowledge necessary for innovation (Heller 1998; David 2001, 
2004; Ghosh 2007; Hess and Ostrom 2007; Hall, Hoffmann, and Ostrowski 2012; 
Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014). This discourse is clearly articulated 
within the emerging literature on knowledge commons and related activism on open 
science, open software, and open government data. Many of these scholars and 
activists visibly locate themselves within a tradition that is opposed to the tenets of 
neoliberalism, particularly unbridled privatisation and a reliance on market actors. 
The tensions and contradictions in using knowledge commons language and 
literature to justify the creation of public private partnerships are an interesting and 
hitherto unexplored avenue of research.  
 
When reviewing southern scholarship on the topic, however, the natural point of 
departure is literature on structural adjustment policies, which have often been 
understood not only as a local form of neoliberalism, but also as a reworking of the 
political economy dynamics of colonialism. Following the oil crisis and a series of 
droughts in the mid-1970s, African governments approached the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for emergency financing, which was provided 
on condition that they implement a package of wide-ranging economic reforms 
known as “structural adjustment.” Between 1981 and 1989, 36 African countries had 
undergone at least one structural adjustment programme (Bujra 1994, 132). These 
mandated reforms typically included the removal of currency exchange controls, a 
substantial reduction in export and corporate taxes, the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and the withdrawal of the state from the provision of public goods, 
including health and education (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). By the end of the 
1980s, scholars noted, many countries had a lower GDP per capita than at 
independence (Fosu, Mlambo, and Oshikoya 2001). External debt (often to former 
colonial powers) had grown to the extent that a number of countries were classified 
as insolvent, and were forced to allocate the majority of their budget to servicing debt 
(Elbadawi and Ndulu 1996). During this time, living standards fell dramatically. The 
sharp currency devaluation accompanied by rising inflation substantially eroded the 
purchasing power of wage earners, who were now also required to pay user fees for 
social services. This period was therefore characterised by growing inequalities in 
access to healthcare and education, and increased mortality and malnutrition 
(Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, 88), where the substantial reversal in post-
independence gains in education and health disproportionately affected women and 
girls (Sanders and Davies 1988; Bassett, Bijlmakers, and Sanders 2000; Potts et al. 
2001; Stromquist 1999; Frimpong 2017). Common to much of the scholarship during 
this period is the view that externally mandated divestment from public goods was a 
central driver of the growth of private sector provision of education and healthcare 
(Owesukon 1985; Usman 1985; Gutto 1988, 1988; Campbell 1989; Zack-Williams 
1993; Himmelstrand 1994; Carnoy 1995; Bassett, Bijlmakers, and Sanders 2000; 
Fosu, Mlambo, and Oshikoya 2001).  
 
An important contribution to this theme is a systematic review of private and public 
health systems in the global South, which finds strong evidence of “competitive 
dynamics” for funding between the two sectors, such that public funds and personnel 
were redirected to private sector development, followed by reductions in public 
sector service budgets and staff Significantly, Basu et al. (2012). This suggests that 
an increased role for the private sector may decrease the quality of the public sector, 
in turn generating further endogenous demand for private health provision. This 
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hypothesised loop of causality, in which the private capture of public funds increases 
local demand for private healthcare provision, appears to have received limited 
empirical attention.  
 
In addition to these material factors, a number of scholars have traced the ways in 
which structural adjustment contributed to the rise of discourses demonising African 
states as inherently corrupt (Kapilashrami and O’Brien 2012; Mkandawire 2015), 
such that the idea of the public good came under increasing pressure (Mustapha 
2012). As Mackintosh and Koivusalo observe (2005, 101), the attendant promotion 
of the commercialisation of healthcare in the 1980s and 1990s “can be understood 
as a deliberative exercise in influencing the intellectual common sense … The pro-
commercialization arguments even came to seem ‘good sense’ in many contexts, 
because of popular experience of deteriorated and even abusive public sectors.” 
This literature suggests a material-ideational dialectic, insofar as divestment from 
public health contributed to the view that healthcare is best provided by private 
actors, which in turn deepened divestment from public health. 
 
However, rather than viewing these developments as simply an outcome of the 
imposition of northern actors, such as the World Bank and IMF, much of the 
scholarship has focused on the dialectic between local and international factors. 
Here, the role of state actors has been subject to extensive scrutiny, particularly with 
regard to their suppression of local dissent against adjustment (see, for instance, 
Bangura, Mustapha, and Adamu 1983; Mkandawire 1985; Mafeje 1990; Mkandawire 
and Soludo 1999, 2003; Federici, Caffentzis, and Alidou 2000), and the ways in 
which this has not only reconfigured and deepened existing gender inequalities but 
has also reshaped gender itself (Savané 1982; Steady 1982; AAWORD 1985; Mama 
1995; Tsikata 1996; Pereira 2002). This literature has in turn given rise to a 
distinctive sociology of scholarship and policymaking, which emphasises that 
informed public deliberation is a critical ingredient in the political and economic 
flourishing of a society, and that scholars and intellectuals play an important role in 
informing public deliberation (see, for instance, Ake 1990; Diouf and Mamdani 1994; 
Mkandawire 2005; Olukoshi 2006; Koch and Weingart 2016).  
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In the context of South Africa, however, structural adjustment programmes were not 
imposed on the country as a condition of emergency financing. Rather, the country 
autonomously adopted a programme very similar to that of structural adjustment, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). Much of the literature 
on this topic has focused on the internal drivers of GEAR. This includes the role of 
the apartheid government’s policy ideas and civil servants in the CODESA 
negotiations to end apartheid (Van Niekerk 2007), as well as the role of progressive 
academic economists and the constraints on their capacity to explore and implement 
more equitable economic policies, such as the collapse of civic organisations and 
social movements in the 1990s, and the intellectual isolation and ossification of 
South African scholarship, which left it vulnerable to the ideational pressures of the 
Washington consensus (Padayachee and Sherbut 2007). However, very little 
scholarship has addressed the surprising convergence of South Africa’s 
policymaking and economic trajectory with that of other former settler colonies on the 
continent. One outstanding exception is Mkandawire’s (2010) study of tax handles, 
which builds on Amin’s (1972, 1976) historical inquiry into colonial institutions to 
demonstrate that different modes of colonial incorporation have resulted in different 
kinds of institutions that persist today. Mkandawire comments that in the post-
independence period, black political elites in former labour reserves (settler colonies) 
may have been institutionally positioned such that they became invested in 
maintaining the institutional arrangements bequeathed by colonialism (2010, 13). 
This suggestive comment, however, does not seem to have been explored in the 
empirical literature on the topic. Potential areas of exploration include not only 
political elites’ use of private health services, but also their role in supplying private 
services to the health sector and the factors responsible for the blurring of 
boundaries between state and private sector interests.  
 
A second potential factor underlying the emergence of PPPs concerns the role of 
race, gender, class and spatial inequalities in South Africa, and how this might create 
endogenous demand for increased involvement of the private sector in public goods 
provision. In a study of the structure and flow of government funding to the public 
and private health sectors in South Africa, du Plessis (2013, 2) finds that “Those who 
access public institutions such as public healthcare are assumed to be ‘dependent’ 
on the state, whilst those who access private health facilities claim to be 
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‘independent’ of the state. However …. these assumptions are flawed. Access to the 
formal labour market, and subsequently the paying of taxes, authorises one to 
access state subsidies not available to those who do not.” The suggestion here is 
that formally employed individuals are incentivised to pursue private healthcare 
through state subsidies, where white people in the private sector and black civil 
servants constitute the majority of those who have access to private health 
insurance. On the flipside, the capacity of a small elite to crowd-in government 
funding for private health services erodes the material base of the public health 
system, as a consequence of which the majority of poor black people who use public 
health are plausibly incentivised to view private healthcare as an aspirational good. 
The dynamics of inequality in creating endogenous demand for forms of privatisation 
have hitherto received very limited empirical attention. An important exception to this 
is Béland and Ridde’s (2016) study of the resistance of policy implementers (such as 
doctors and nurses) against the removal of health-care user fees currently taking 
place in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors find that problems with implementing more 
public forms of healthcare engender skepticism about its sustainability, and that in 
some countries, there is outright ideological resistance to public health on the 
grounds that it encourages frivolous use and dependence on the state. However, the 
vectors of inequality, such as class, gender, race and region are not explored in this 
literature. Further careful empirical work is needed to understand the different 
vectors of inequality and the ways in which this drives or curtails demand for public 
private partnerships in health.  
 
A third strand of literature focuses on the dynamics of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
emerging from the global South. Multinational companies based in South Africa have 
been the subject of particular analysis given their emerging dominance not only 
within Africa but also increasingly in Western Europe and Western Asia (the Arabian 
peninsula). The most prominent of these is Netcare, which has expanded into 
Lesotho, Botswana and the UK, and constitutes not only the largest private hospital 
provider in the UK but is also a key actor in the emergence of PPPs in the NHS 
(Lethbridge 2007; Mortensen 2008; Player and Leys 2008; Hildyard 2014; Sakr and 
Jordaan 2016, 2017b, 2017a). However, this literature is largely located within a 
tradition that examines the dynamics of FDI emerging from the global South (namely, 
a pattern of first South-South investment and then an expansion into northern 
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markets). Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of companies such as 
Netcare in reconfiguring the relation between the state and the market, and the 
nature of health as a public good in both the South and the North.  
 
Related to this, there appears to be no literature examining state subsidies to the 
private health sector as a form of industrial policy. This framing is useful, since 
although this was clearly not intended as a form of industrial policy, it has managed 
to enable the expansion of southern industries into the North. In contrast, other forms 
of industrial policy, such as those targeting original equipment manufacturing in the 
transportation sector, have demonstrably failed (Rennkamp and Boyd 2015; 
Fessehaie, Roberts, and Takala-Greenish 2015; Black, Craig, and Dunne 2016; 
Masondo 2018). Understanding why state support for private hospital chains in 
South Africa has enabled them to expand into other markets, vis-à-vis other 
industrial sectors, may be useful for understanding the constraints and possibilities of 
new forms of industrial policy in the country. 
 
 
3.5. Main debates 
3.5.1. Contesting the partnership paradigm 
 
Languille (2017) observes that advocates of PPPs in health and education focus on 
four dimensions: win-win interactions, innovation, choice and efficiency. Accordingly, 
critics of PPPs attempt to demonstrate that PPPs are not truly a partnership, that 
they do not foster innovation, and that they are not efficient. As the discussion of the 
literature on NGO provision in section three demonstrates, southern literature 
focuses on the blurring of roles between state and non-state actors and the 
consequences of this for the legitimacy and coherence of the state. 
 
However, the regulatory dynamics of such partnerships remain largely unexplored. 
This is in part because of the secrecy and complexity governing the contractual 
arrangements between state and non-state actors in general (Romero 2015). In the 
context of Southern and East Africa, this appears to be linked in part to the weak 
regulatory environment in which for-profit healthcare companies operate, where 
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legislation typically focuses on controlling the entry of private providers and health 
insurers into the market, but does not provide legislation for controlling or monitoring 
the type, volume, distribution, quality and price of healthcare services (Doherty 
2015). The regulatory dynamics of health PPPs in this context suffer then from a 
double absence of regulation – a lack of general regulation of the private healthcare 
sector coupled with a lack of specific regulation of PPPs. In the South African 
context, the state currently provides no publicly-available information on tenders that 
have been awarded to non-state actors. While National Treasury has set up an 
eTender portal which provides information on all calls for PPP tenders, and has a 
section for awarded tenders (www.etenders.gov.za), there is no data on which entity 
has been awarded a tender for what work, nor does the portal provide the winning 
tender documents or the ensuing contracts with the state. The author’s 
correspondence with National Treasury officials indicated that the Treasury PPP 
guidelines provide that the PPP agreement must be made available to the Auditor 
General for auditing purposes and is silent on disclosure for any other reason 
(Hltashwayo 2017). However, since the National Treasury is not the custodian of the 
PPP agreement, only the relevant Department can make the decision to disclose the 
PPP agreement. Yet in the context of fiscal and administrative decentralisation, the 
national Department of Health is not privy to PPP agreements entered into by 
provincial departments of health. Thus, in order to access information on PPPs in 
health, one would therefore need to request the Department of Health at national or 
provincial level for access to this information, which they might grant at their 
discretion. As a consequence, there is no policy requiring confidentiality, nor is there 
a policy requiring transparency. In effect, the policy is to have no policy, which in turn 
makes it difficult to hold state actors accountable for access to information.  
 
This suggests three key gaps in the empirical literature. First, there is a need to trace 
the process by which policies governing PPPs have emerged. Second, there is a 
need to conduct investigative research into the scope of health PPPs, including the 
(mis)match between the promises made in tender documents, the contractual 
obligations of the PPP, and the results on the ground. This could be done by 
launching a mass request for information using the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, which gives legal effect to the constitutional right to access to 
information. Third, there is a need to identify the networks of state and non-state 
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actors involved in these PPP arrangements. This would be helpful in investigating, 
for instance, whether large-scale PPPs are clustered around particular families and 
contribute to the emergence of dynastic politics. 
 
 
3.5.2. The reconfiguration of state/market relations 
 
Languille (2017) notes that northern literature on PPPs in the South tend to highlight 
the blurring of boundaries between the state and the market, and in the process, 
reconfigure the divide between public and private goods. While the empirical 
literature focuses on the role of multilateral state configurations in driving PPPs, 
there is comparatively little scholarship on the way in which national states operate 
as market makers. Moreover, she observes, the notion of ‘profit’, which drives 
corporate interest in PPPs, is seldom treated as an analytical concept in the 
empirical literature. In particular, very little empirical work has been done on the 
financialisation of PPPs. Languille notes that a rare exception to this is the work of 
McGoey (2014), who explores the direct link between the increasing reliance of 
private firms on state subsidies and financialisation, which leads private companies 
to decrease their investments in research and development, such that the costs and 
risks of investments for innovation are socialised while the financial benefits are 
crowded-in by a few individuals.  
 
A review of southern literature on the topic indicates that these processes of 
financialisation have likewise received very little scholarly attention. In particular, the 
role of southern private companies in reshaping public health, both within the South 
and the North, remains a key gap in the literature. The provision of state subsidies to 
South African firms, such as Netcare and Medi-Clinic, in the form of tax credits, 
indirect state funding in the form of the Government Employees’ Medical Scheme, 
and direct state investment in the form of the Public Investment Corporation has 
been well-documented in the literature (McIntyre 2010; Ashman, Fine, and Newman 
2011; Fine 2012; Hildyard 2014; du Plessis 2013). Less well-documented, however, 
is the ways in which these multiple state subsidies may have facilitated their 
expansion into Southern Africa, Western Europe and Western Asia. With regard to 
their expansion in Southern Africa, the relationship between South African 
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companies and regional organisations, such as the South African Development 
Community and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, remains underexplored 
with the exception of a few studies that focus on infrastructure PPPs (Miller 2004; 
Roodt 2008). Moreover, while northern literature on PPPs often identifies northern 
agendas and institutions as key drivers of PPPs, these examples show that the 
dynamics are more complex. In the same way as scholars have written about 
colonies as the laboratory of modernity (see, for instance, Wright 1987; Comaroff 
and Comaroff 2012), it may be useful to consider the extent to which the post-
colonies act as the laboratory of new forms of state-market relations across the 
global South and North, and the dynamics and consequences of this. 
 
Related to this, there is a need to explore the ways in which public goods are 
conceptualised in the global South, particularly within former labour reserve 
economies defined by deep social cleavages that contour the ways in which public 
goods are provided and accessed. As Mustapha (2012) notes in his review of 
literature on the notion of the public and the ways in which it might be reconfigured 
within African contexts, the capacity of the public good to act as a public sphere 
within these contexts, and thereby lessen social distance and foster public 
deliberation, remains largely unexplored in the literature. This may be in part 
because of the ideological dominance of discourses demonising African states as 
inherently neopatrimonial and emphasising the role of NGOs as the primary actor of 
civil society and a necessary defence against corruption (Kapilashrami and O’Brien 
2012; Mkandawire 2015). While there is some empirical literature examining the 
ways in which patients understand the character of healthcare in India, and how 
commercialisation has shaped their values and aspirations (Baru 2005), it appears 
that there is little empirical research examining how patients, medical practitioners, 
administrators and policymakers conceptualise the character of healthcare in former 
labour reserve economies, both in terms of its ability to function as a public good and 
its capacity to function as a public sphere. What work there is on the topic is largely 
theoretical and conceptual (Gueye 1997; Mbow 1999; Singh 2001; Zeleza 2005; 
Tilak 2009; Assie-Lumumba 2011; Walker 2012; de Sousa Santos 2013; Singh 
2014).  
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3.5.3. Outcomes 
 
Languille (2017) notes that northern literature on the topic explores the consequence 
of PPPs in terms of equitable access and costs. These costs include opportunity 
costs, such as a focus on cure versus prevention, technological versus social 
perspectives, and the increasing fragility of national health systems, as well as 
hidden costs, such as is involved with the administration of vouchers. Languille 
observes that while discourses in favour of PPPs often emphasise their capacity to 
enhance equitable access, there is still little evidence as to whether marginalised 
groups access and benefit from these arrangements. 
 
A review of southern databases on this topic nuances this view. In the case of South 
Africa in particular, there are strong cleavages in the literature. On the one end of the 
spectrum, there is a large body of literature that advocates for the private sector in 
general, and PPPs in particular. Much of this can be found within health journals 
(Mokoena 1999; Wheeler and Berkley 2001; Reich 2002; Buso 2004; Sinanovic and 
Kumaranayake 2006; Bateman 2010; Hardcastle 2011; Essack 2012), some of 
which provide editorial space for the directors of private insurance companies and 
hospitals (see, for instance, Bateman 2014). In contrast, literature that is less 
concerned to demonstrate the benefits of the private sector, or is more sceptical 
about its benefits, is less concentrated and can be found within both health and 
social science publications (Mortensen 2008; McIntyre 2010; Basu et al. 2012; 
Warner 2013; Surender et al. 2014). 
 
With regard to the global South more generally, there is a considerable body of 
evidence on the private provision of healthcare, and several systematic reviews have 
been conducted comparing private health systems against public health systems, in 
terms of the quality of care, health outcomes, equity of access, and cost 
effectiveness (Yoong et al. 2010; Basu et al. 2012; Health and Education Advice and 
Resource Team 2016). While these reviews do not provide direct evidence of the 
impact of public private partnerships, they do provide indirect evidence of the 
implications of private sector participation in public healthcare in terms of cost 
efficiency, investment in infrastructure, and patient health outcomes. The reviews 
find that the available evidence indicates that private sector actors more frequently 
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violated medical standards of practice and had poorer patient outcomes, but had 
improved reported timeliness and hospitality to patients. Reported efficiency tended 
to be lower in the private sector. There is some evidence that this may be partially a 
result of perverse incentives for unnecessary testing and treatment (Basu et al. 
2012). On the flipside, several scholars have documented the reluctance of 
corporations to sustain ownership and provision of hospital care, and the extensive 
profit taking, risk shedding and corporate exit experienced in the sector across Asia, 
Europe and the Americas (Lethbridge, Mackintosh, and Koivusalo 2005; Jasso-
Aguilar, Waitzkin, and Landwehr 2005). However, relative to the private sector, 
public sector services experienced more limited availability of medication, 
equipment, and trained healthcare professionals.  
 
There is also direct evidence of the outcomes of PPPs on funding flows. As 
discussed in the section on drivers of PPPs, the evidence of “competitive dynamics” 
for funding between the public and the private, such that the private sector captures 
public funding through PPPs and thereby diminishes the quality of public healthcare, 
in turn raises the prospect of endogeneity within the health system (Basu et al. 
2012). In this causal loop, increased public funding for the private sector contributes 
to the decline in the quality of the public sector, which in turn leads to increased 
demand for private health services. This may help explain the findings of a 
longitudinal study of 163 countries by Mackintosh and Koivusalo (2005). The study 
finds that the share of public healthcare in GDP is wholly uncorrelated with countries’ 
income per capita, but that higher shares of private spending in total health spending 
are strongly associated, across countries, with lower average incomes per capita. 
Moreover, the poorer a country, the more likely it is that the population employs out-
of-pocket expenditure, where this weighs most heavily on those with lower incomes 
and excludes the very poor. In other words, increased private spending on 
healthcare is strongly correlated with decreased public provision of healthcare, 
where this correlation is not conditional on the wealth of a country.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, there is a need to understand how some forms of 
PPPs, such as co-location arrangements, deepen race and class-based segregation. 
More deeply then, a key empirical gap in the literature is an evaluation of the ways in 
which PPPs shape notions of social citizenship: that is, the relationship between 
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government policies and the social right of citizens to a minimally acceptable 
livelihood outside the market, where this relationship is contoured by the political and 
economic conditions that make it possible for individuals and social groups to be 
included as members of society through the exercise or denial of social rights. 
Related to this, there is a need to examine the ways in which PPPs shapes 
democratic institutions and practices; for instance, through their effects on unions 
and popular political action, and how they may erode or strengthen citizens’ capacity 
to hold the state accountable. 
 
 
3.5.4. The lack of evidence 
 
Languille (2017) notes that experimental research yields conflicting results 
depending on the model used and argues that there is an over-reliance on 
experimental research and insufficient qualitative research. However, a recent 
systematic review of 68 empirical studies on PPPs in Southern Africa finds that the 
majority of articles presented findings from qualitative (56%) and mixed methods 
studies (35%). Only 9% of the articles employed quantitative methods, of which only 
1% employed experimental methods. Nevertheless, given that experiments are 
increasingly seen to provide the ‘gold standard’ of evidence in policymaking (The 
Lancet 2004), there is also a need understand the social processes and 
consequences of experiments in social policy.  
 
In this regard, there are two types of experiments in social policy that are of interest. 
First, economists increasingly use the methods of clinical experimentation to 
evaluate the outcomes of social policy interventions. These randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) seek to draw generalisable conclusions about the effects of policy 
interventions on large representative samples. In doing so, such policy RCTs invert 
the logic of traditional policy research. While non-experimental research musters pre-
existing evidence in favour of a proposed policy reform, policy RCTs collapse the 
distinction between evidence and policy: they use policy reforms as evidence. Thus, 
the question of how policies are implemented becomes at the same time a question 
of empirical rigour. So, for instance, the financial stakes of a policy intervention can 
introduce the possibility of a conflict of interests, so that experimentalists become 
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biased in the experimental design or interpretation of results. While the problem of a 
conflict of interests is well-recognised in medical experimentation, it does not appear 
to be recognised as a significant issue in RCTs in social policy. Conversely, 
questions about experimental ethics become at the same time questions about the 
role of the state in eroding or upholding democratic values and constitutional rights. 
So, for instance, a large-scale RCT that seeks to test the effects of casualising public 
staff will run up against not only the experimental ethics of introducing precarious 
working conditions but also the state’s obligations to its citizens, thereby potentially 
catalysing significant political resistance and major volatility in the public sector (for 
an example of this dynamic see the RCT on Kenyan teachers run by Bold et al. 
2013). 
 
In situations where high financial stakes and a limited democratic mandate converge, 
policy RCTs may be characterised by the lack of accountability and social isolation 
that typified much of the scholarship underlying structural adjustment programmes, 
and led to research that was deeply resistant to empirical evidence (Mkandawire and 
Soludo 1999). Linked to this, it is important to understand under what conditions 
policy RCTs may act to erode the democratic functioning of society and destabilise 
public goods provision. This appears to be unexplored in the literature. 
 
A second kind of experiment in social policy involves policy-makers who introduce 
large-scale health system modifications (in terms of policies and programmes). 
These have been called a form of social experimentation, since they operate in an 
analogous fashion to clinical trials in two respects. First, the goal of policy 
interventions is presumably to “improve the delivery of health services though 
methods that there is good reason to think will work, based on relevant evidence. 
Since both pilots and scaled up efforts often involve untested components, they 
qualify as social experimentation.” (Daniels and Sanders 2005, 1) The second goal 
must be to protect the patient population from risks while attempting to deliver 
benefits. As with medical trials, there must therefore be a way to use evidence to 
assess these risks ahead of time and to monitor and evaluate them as 
implementation proceeds (Daniels and Sanders 2005, 2). 
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However, unlike clinical experimentation, such forms of social experimentation are 
not subject to ethical review boards that enable a minimal form of accountability to 
be placed on the implementing agency, insofar as there is no regulatory mechanism 
requiring social experiments to (i) have a sound evidence-base for the reform, and 
(ii) provide adequate protection of people affected by it through a careful assessment 
of risks and benefits and monitoring and evaluation of its implementation (Daniels 
2006). The risk of harm is arguably larger than in clinical experiments insofar as 
social experiments affect entire populations, where participants are unable to give 
informed consent or opt out of the experiment (Panisset et al. 2012; Dixon-Woods et 
al. 2011). Where social experiments are designed and evaluated by external actors 
such as donor agencies, international financial organisations or international NGOs, 
the lack of mechanisms to ensure their accountability to local states and populations 
(as described in the previous section) increases the risk of large-scale harm 
(González-Pier et al. 2006; Hyder et al. 2014). Understanding the processes by 
which such forms of social experimentation are designed and evaluated has 
increasingly become a site of empirical and theoretical enquiry (Mkandawire 1999; 
Koch and Weingart 2016). Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the 
ways in which such forms of social experimentation render society a laboratory for 
reconfiguring state-market relations. As the preceding sections show, this is a key 
knowledge gap. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion: key knowledge gaps 
 
Languille (2017) draws several insights from her review of northern literature on 
PPPs in education and health in the global South. First, she indicates that “Most 
studies are … sceptical about the impact of these schemes.” However, this is clearly 
not the case in the literature considered in this review, for a considerable swathe of 
literature advocates PPPs on the grounds of scarce public resources, increased 
efficiency and quality. Much of this literature approaches PPPs as a necessity, 
echoing the ‘common sense’ view that African countries should divest from public 
health during structural adjustment. This literature is typically found within health 
journals, some of which provide editorial space for the directors of private insurance 
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companies and hospitals. In contrast, literature that is less concerned to demonstrate 
the benefits of the private sector, or is more sceptical about its benefits, is less 
concentrated and can be found within both health and social science publications. 
Thus, while Languille observes that much of the literature on PPPs is controlled by 
their main international advocates, particularly international financial institutions, 
northern-based philanthrocapitalists and aid organisations, private companies in the 
global South may also have a role to play in shaping academic discourses and 
agendas on the topic.  
 
Second, Languille observes that northern literature on the topic does not provide 
data on the extent to which education and health services in the South are delivered 
through PPP mechanisms, so that there is a need to conduct more systematic 
mapping. However, a review of southern literature on the topic indicates that this is 
incorrect. There is at least one existing mapping exercise on the role of private 
actors in public healthcare provision in South Africa (Dambisya, Modipa, and others 
2009). Nevertheless, given rapid changes in the health sector there is clearly a need 
to provide an updated map of health PPPs. This is particularly important, given the 
general secrecy and complexity governing the contractual arrangements between 
state and non-state actors, which significantly limits the possibility of detailed 
empirical investigation into the regulatory relationship between state and non-state 
actors in health PPPs, particularly in Africa. This suggests three critical areas of 
enquiry into the regulation of PPPs. First, there is a need to trace the processes by 
which de facto policies of secrecy and complexity governing PPPs have emerged. 
Second there is a need to conduct investigative research into the scope of health 
PPPs in order to identify their financial scale and their implications for public debt, 
and consider the extent to which the promises made in tender documents, accord 
with the contractual obligations of the PPP and the results on the ground. Third, 
there is a need to identify the networks of state and non-state actors involved in 
these PPP arrangements. This would be helpful in investigating the endogenous 
drivers of PPPs, by considering, for instance, whether large-scale PPPs are 
clustered around particular families and contribute to the emergence of dynastic 
politics. 
 
47 
 
Third, Languille argues that the theoretical grounding of most studies remains 
limited: “There is little discussion of the significance of education and health PPPs in 
relation to the current phase of capitalism, in its material dimensions, in low and 
middle-income countries. With few exceptions, most analyses focus on the 
ideological dimension of the present era – the re-articulation of the relation between 
the market and the state. They do not dwell on the transformation of capitalism, its 
increasing financialisation, its penetration of non-traditional sectors (such as health 
and education) and the shift from long term, productive imperatives to short term 
shareholders’ demands for high returns on investments.” This review confirms this 
view and suggests potential theoretical perspectives to deepen and guide empirical 
investigations into the financialisation of PPPs and the role of inequality in creating 
endogenous demand for PPPs: namely, theories of colonial incorporation located 
within the dependency theory approach (Amin 1972, 1976; Mkandawire 2010) as 
well as theories of racial capitalism expanded to include other intersecting vectors of 
dispossession, such as gender and region (Magubane 1976; Garba and Adesina 
2007; Adésínà 2009).  
 
Fourth, Languille argues that there is very little qualitative research on PPPs, 
particularly on the relation between state and capital. This review finds that, in the 
context of Southern Africa and South Africa in particular, this is incorrect. As Whyle 
and Olivier (2016) demonstrate in their systematic review of literature on public 
private engagement in Southern Africa, there is a fairly large, and growing, empirical 
literature on PPPs, where the overwhelming majority of these are qualitative and 
mixed methods studies, which draw on a variety of methods including surveys, case 
studies, ethnographies, interviews and focus group discussions. However, much of 
the literature is skewed towards South Africa, and there is a need for further studies 
of the dynamics and outcomes of PPPs in the rest of Southern Africa.  
 
Fifth, Languille claims that there is little data on the corporate sector. This is difficult 
to ascertain, given that Languille does not review existing databases of corporate 
data, such as OpenCorporates. In this context, there is a need to mine such 
databases for corporate data in order to build a more detailed picture of the flows 
and structure of for-profit healthcare provision. In addition, given this review’s 
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findings that NGOs and NPOs play a central role in PPPs, there is a need to develop 
a database of the extent and type of NGO and NPO healthcare provision.  
 
Finally, Languille asserts that the views of the ‘beneficiaries’ of PPPs have received 
limited empirical attention, where these encompass state officials, health front-line 
agents, and patients. However, as this review shows, there is a growing body of 
literature that elicits the views of doctors and patients on the role of at least one 
major proposed PPP in South Africa – the National Health Insurance scheme 
(Shisana et al. 2006; McIntyre et al. 2009; Weimann and Stuttaford 2014; Moosa et 
al. 2016; Surender, Van Niekerk, and Alfers 2016), while a small body of literature 
also reviews the policy positions of various key actors in the NHI, such as political 
parties, medical schemes and trade unions (McIntyre 2010; von Holdt 2014; Rispel 
2016; van Niekerk 2016). Moreover, there is a large-scale review of existing surveys 
of implementers of healthcare across Africa that demonstrates the importance of 
implementation problems in shaping resistance to or acceptance of public goods 
provision (Béland and Ridde 2016). Thus, this review shows that the views of 
doctors and patients on South African PPPs, and to a lesser extent, those of 
politicians, have already been examined in the scholarly literature. Instead, it may be 
important to elicit the views of these groups in terms of the logic of the NHI as a PPP 
arrangement that seeks to (re)introduce the public into the private. In particular, it 
would be useful to examine: the state’s attempts to discipline the private sector 
through this PPP; ideational, political and economic constraints on these attempts; 
the unfolding dialectic between the state and the private sector; and the ways in 
which this shapes social understandings of healthcare as a public good and the 
nature of social citizenship. 
 
Overall then, this review of southern literature identifies empirical work that plugs 
knowledge gaps in the northern literature, and suggests a slightly different 
orientation to the analysis of health PPPs. While northern literature tends to 
emphasise the role of northern actors and drivers in the expansion of health PPPs, 
southern literature calls attention to the endogenous dynamics of PPPs and the ways 
in which these intersect with the global. This in turn provides distinctive theoretical 
tools for investigating PPPs in the South, including models of racial capitalism and 
settler colonialism.  
49 
 
 
This suggests a number of avenues for empirical and theoretical enquiry (as outlined 
in Table 3 below), which can be broadly grouped into three areas. First, there is 
limited empirical work on the endogenous dynamics of health PPPs in the global 
South. On the one hand, there is very little information on the scale of health PPPs in 
terms of for-profit and non-profit entities, as well as the implications of health PPPs 
for public health financing and national debt. On the other hand, we do not fully 
understand the locally-situated drivers of PPPs. In the context of South Africa, this 
includes factors such as the persistence of colonial institutions, the social dynamics 
of inequality, and the role of state financing for the private sector, which constitutes a 
form of industrial policy.  
 
Second, little is known about the ways in which endogenous drivers of PPPs interact 
with more global dynamics. These global dynamics do not only include the influence 
of international entities controlled by northern actors, but also the expansion of 
southern healthcare companies into the global North. Careful empirical investigation 
into the interplay of endogenous and global dynamics will allow for an exploration of 
the ways in which PPPs constitute a laboratory for experimenting with new forms of 
state-market relations across the global South and North, and the dynamics and 
consequences of this. From a different angle, state support for the rapid expansion 
of South African companies into other markets, such as Netcare and Medi-Clinic, 
constitutes a de facto form of industrial policy. Understanding why this form of 
industrial policy has succeeded in enabling the expansion of an infant industry, vis-à-
vis the failure of industrial policy targeting original equipment manufacturing, is an 
important and hitherto unexplored empirical project.  
 
Third, PPPs are typically conceptualised as an attempt to bring the logic of the 
market into public goods provision, and their merits or disadvantages are judged 
accordingly. However, as the discussion of the NHI demonstrates, there is nothing 
intrinsically market-orientated about PPPs. PPPs can also act as an attempt to 
decommodify healthcare by bringing the private sector back into the ambit of the 
public, and thereby discipline it and eventually dissolve it. Indeed, it is precisely the 
recognition of the existential threat that the NHI poses to the private health sector 
that appears to have galvanised extensive efforts by the private health sector to 
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subvert and weaken the NHI. It is within this context that it is important to understand 
the ways in which the NHI has structured tensions between the state and the private 
sector, the mechanisms available for disciplining the private sector, and the 
constraints on the state’s attempt to do so. 
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Table 3: Knowledge gaps in health PPPs 
 What do we know? What do we need to know? 
 
Types of 
PPPs 
Can be divided into PPPs that operate at the global scale, through 
global health initiatives for vaccine and drug development, and PPPs 
that operate within countries. 
 
In-country PPP sub-types: 
- PPPs with for-profits: co-location is dominant model in the 
literature 
- PPPs with NGOs and NPPs: state driven or globally driven 
(through Global Health Initiatives) 
- National Health Insurance: an attempt to bring private sector 
actors back into the public (decommodifying private health), 
rather than making the public sector more private 
(marketization) 
 
 
How does the NHI act as a PPP that that seeks to (re)introduce the 
public into the private, rather than bringing the private into the 
public?  
- How does this structure tensions between state and private 
actors? 
- What are the mechanisms for disciplining the private sector 
and the constraints on the state’s attempts to do so?  
- In what ways do the interests of the private sector and civil 
servants at different levels of the state coincide or conflict, 
and with what consequences?  
- How does decentralisation shape the limits and possibilities 
of the NHI?  
- How does the NHI shape broader social understandings of 
healthcare as a public good? 
Scale of 
PPPs 
One mapping activity of the role of private actors in public provision in 
South Africa finds that in 1999, 10% of public hospital budgets was 
spent on the private sector (Dambisya, Modipa, and others 2009). This 
is now out of date, and is likely to be a lower-bound estimate given the 
secrecy and complexity of PPPs in South Africa. 
 
What is the scale of health PPPs in South Africa? 
- Which for-profit and non-profit entities are involved in health 
PPPs?  
- What was the original tender value of each project, and 
what is its final value? 
- What are the implications of this for the national budget and 
national debt? 
 
Actors in 
PPPs 
Some evidence on northern institutional actors: international financial 
institutions, philanthropic organisations, development agencies. Little 
evidence on private companies’ incentives and benefits. 
What is the relationship between actors in the public and private 
sector? 
- What are the networks of public and private sector actors in 
health PPPs?  
- What conflicts of interest exist, and what does this imply for 
the dynamics of emerging dynasties? 
 
Drivers of 
PPPs 
Northern scholarship focuses on neoliberal globalisation and 
intellectual property rights. 
Southern scholarship: 
- Structural adjustment: lays material and ideational foundations 
What are the endogenous drivers of PPPs? 
- Competitive dynamics: to what extent do state subsidies to 
the private sector decrease the quality of public healthcare, 
and thereby generate endogenous demand for privatisation 
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of PPPs 
- Inequalities of settler colonialism: white economic elites and 
black political elites are institutionally positioned such that they 
are invested in maintaining the institutional arrangements 
bequeathed by colonialism 
- Southern FDI: state subsidies to private healthcare companies 
in the South (such as Netcare) allows them to expand into 
other regions of the South as well as the North; in doing so, 
they begin to push for PPPs as a way of expanding their 
market 
 
from patients?  
- How does political elites’ use of private health services 
shape health policy and public aspirations? 
- How does the dominance of international and white capital 
push black political elites into supplying private services to 
the public health sector? 
- How do the intersecting inequalities of race, gender, class 
and space create endogenous demand for increased 
involvement of the private sector in public goods provision? 
- How have state subsidies to private South African hospitals 
enabled them to expand vigorously into other markets, 
while state support for other infant industries has failed? 
What light does this cast on the constraints and possibilities 
of industrial policy in South Africa? 
 
Regulation 
of PPPs 
- Regulation of private healthcare in Southern and East Africa: 
tends to focus on controlling the entry of private providers and 
health insurers into the market; there is little regulation to 
monitor and control the type, volume, distribution, quality and 
price of health care services 
- Regulation of health PPPs in South Africa: no publicly 
available information on tenders submitted, tenders awarded, 
the ensuing contracts or outcomes. While the National 
Treasury sets the regulatory framework for PPPs, this 
framework makes no provision for keeping PPP information 
confidential or public. In effect, the policy on access to 
information on PPPs is to have no policy, which in turn makes 
it difficult to hold state actors accountable for access to 
information. 
- Regulation of donor driven PPPs: little if no regulation 
 
What are the political economy dynamics of PPP regulation? 
- How have policies and regulatory frameworks governing 
PPPs emerged? 
- What is the relationship between promises made in 
tenders, what is stipulated in contracts, and what is 
delivered on the ground?  
- Under what conditions are companies more/less likely to 
violate tender and contractual agreements? 
- What mechanisms are there for improving international 
donors’ accountability to national states or ensuring that 
donor programmes do not have a destabilising effect on 
public health systems? 
Outcomes Reconfiguration of state-market relations 
- Very little is known 
Outcomes: inequality 
- Very little is known 
 
How are state-market relations reconfigured from the perspective of 
the South? 
- How do states operate as market makers? 
- What are the dynamics and consequences of the 
financialisation of PPPs? 
- How do private healthcare providers in the global South 
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shape public health in both the South and the North? 
- How do post-colonies act as the laboratory of new forms of 
state-market relations across the global South and North? 
- How do different members of society conceptualise the 
character of healthcare in former settler colonies, both in 
terms of its ability to function as a public good and its 
capacity to function as a public sphere? 
 
How do PPPs shape notions of social citizenship? 
- To what extent do certain types of PPPs, such as the co-
location model, reproduce race and class-based 
segregation?  
- What are the dynamics and consequences of this?  
 
Conflict of 
interest 
Northern academic advocates of PPPs are typically funded by 
international financial institutions, northern-based philanthrocapitalists 
and aid organisations 
How do private companies in the global South play a role in shaping 
academic discourses and agendas on the topic? 
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4. Literature review of education PPPs in the Global South 
focusing on South Africa 
 
The conceptual discussion in Section One noted that PPPs have emerged as a 
widely-touted policy arrangement as a result of global and local trends towards 
hybridising the make-up of public service provision (Robertson et al, 2012; Verger, 
2012; Caerus Capital, 2017). They have also been encouraged in the formulation of 
key global agendas such as Education For All and the Sustainable (formerly 
Millennium) Development Goals, which give an important role for the private sector 
(including corporations) in the expansion of access and the meeting of particular 
targets. In this context, education provision is tied to its creation of social and 
economic actors, and access to education as critical for performance in the labour 
market (Gershberg & Winkler, 2006; Ball & Youdell, 2008). 
 
 
4.1. Situating the debates 
 
Globalisation plays an important role in contributing to the spread of PPPs, creating 
what Verger (2012) terms ‘cognitive locks’ in the types of solutions, mechanisms and 
arrangements proposed for resolving challenges in schooling equity and access. The 
discussion has previously noted the intersection between a global politics of 
cooperation in the post-Cold War era and greater emphasis on economic austerity 
and accountability on the part of governments. Indeed, framing the choices made 
around private intervention are the global agendas described above, as well as key 
international organisations and sources of donor funding, which together shape the 
discourse of privatisation as a useful, urgent and necessary response to the crises of 
state inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of accountability (Schwab, 2008; Ball & 
Youdell, 2008; Caerus Capital, 2017). They also, besides setting discourses and 
cognitive frames, create spaces which legitimate who receives funding and on what 
conditions, creating an entanglement between endogenous and exogenous drivers 
of privatisation. Reform agendas travel across contexts through the influence of 
powerful multilateral organisations, such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund; through coercive mechanisms attached to funding; and through the 
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promotion of ‘best practice’ by financial and consulting bodies, think-tanks and NGOs 
(Ball & Youdell, 2008). Robertson et al (2012) note at least five international drivers 
of policy convergence around privatisation, namely: 
1. Similar problems faced by countries which result in ‘similar, but independent’ 
solutions and responses; 
2. Imposition of particular policies and mechanisms by powerful actors (states, 
institutions or organisations) through coercive mechanisms often related to 
debt, trade, or aid; 
3. Compliance that forces convergence as a result of being signatory to 
particular multilateral agreements 
4. Regulatory competition, i.e. shifts in policy in order for countries to remain 
competitive in increasingly integrated regional and global markets; and 
5. Soft mechanisms such as joint problem-solving, often in more informal 
transnational policy networks (Robertson et al, 2012:17). 
These promoted reforms then meet with local and regional conditions such as social, 
political and economic inequality, or poor public service provision either nationally or 
to particular geographic or social segments of society. These conditions can 
intersect with (and legitimate) the broader policy and intellectual motivations behind 
PPPs, where the state is: positioned as failing to be responsive to the needs of 
learners (and parents); characterised by resource wastage and inefficiency; and 
constrained by bureaucratic requirements including the unionisation of teachers (Ball 
& Youdell, 2008). Private sector intervention here is read as responding to the 
challenges of state failure by transforming public institutions and the public sector at 
large according to the logics of the market. Demand for and supply of private 
intervention can thus be both endogenous (driven by local, including community 
interests) and exogenous (including external and global influences and actors) 
(Verger et al, 2016).  
 
A good example is the way that discourses of state failure in Africa relate to an 
absence of good governance and accountability in the public sector (Mundy, 2008). 
Here, civil society, particularly NGOs, play a crucial role in redirecting and controlling 
donor funding towards social investment projects, further transposing the ideological 
and economic rationalities of their (often Northern) funders into local contexts while 
also occupying major institutional spaces within (and sometimes in opposition to) the 
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state (Mundy, 2008). At the same time, local communities may seek out private 
alternatives to low-quality or absent public provision. Inasmuch as global policy-
setting did not substantively engage the complexities of civil and citizen participation 
as part of the privatisation agenda, the local-level consideration was foundational to 
the promotion of decentralised governance – a policy provision that is critical to the 
promotion of privatisation as well as the semi-privatisation of public goods. Paoletto 
(2000) argues that decentralisation is an important consideration in the case of 
education and PPPs because of how resources can be used in contextually relevant 
ways, tailored to suit individual school or district needs. He posits that government 
administration is too cumbersome to manage the needs of schools with the 
immediacy that more autonomous schools may be able to respond with (Paoletto, 
2000). Positive cooperation in education PPPs is a result of interests coalescing 
around the success of the teaching and learning project: for learners and their 
families, greater attainment and opportunity; for private firms, improved 
competitiveness and profit-making; for the state, the expansion of education as a 
social good and a facilitator of economic productivity.  
 
The spread of PPPs in education is part of a growing global governance agenda in 
which there is a strong move to deregulate, devolve, and ultimately privatise all or 
some aspects of education provision. Motala and Pampallis (2005) identify four 
forms that decentralisation can take with reference to schooling.  
Deconcentration shifts responsibility (not authority) from 
the central government to lower 
governance levels which positions the 
central government in an oversight and 
regulatory role (Prew et al, 2011) 
Delegation  shifts some decision-making to local 
authorities while retaining power at the 
centre and identifying particular 
procedures under which local 
authorities may exercise choice 
Devolution Local authorities (such as PEDs or even 
schools) are given authority and (at 
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least some degree of) financial flexibility 
to make decisions (Prew et al, 2011). 
This is usually enacted through 
legislative mechanisms 
Privatisation in this schema is the last frontier of 
decentralisation as ‘owners of 
institutions’ are given decision-making 
power, occurring in three ways: where 
schools are publically subsidised and do 
not charge fees as a condition of this; 
where schools receive public subsidies 
but are able to top these up with fee-
paying, and enjoy more autonomy; and 
finally where schools are privately 
funded and thus have full control over 
their management (Prew et al, 2011) 
 
Decentralisation can moreover be characterised by two shifts: one, the shift in 
decision-making responsibilities from national government to local authorities such 
as provinces or districts, and two, from these authorities down to the level of the 
school to make individual choices about service delivery and provision. 
Lacking in the discussion of decentralisation is teachers and how teacher careers 
are affected by decentralisation and privatisation. The passing of hiring teachers 
from government to private providers sees the deregulation of labour and de-
unionisation of the teaching force (Oketch & Rolleston, 2007; Verger, 2012). Unions 
are viewed as a key factor in the high cost of teacher labour and securing their buy-
in in these initiatives, as challenging as this would be in practice, is a significant 
influence on the success of partnerships and privatisation. Job security and 
performance-related pay are two factors that make this shift undesirable for teachers 
in traditional public education systems. Official partnerships are by their nature linked 
to some form of development strategy, but in the case of education these need to be 
as relevant to each ‘community, school district, and school’ (Paoletto, 2000: 44) as 
possible in order to make a significant impact. This includes taking into account how 
the teaching force is affected by changes in curriculum, governance and personnel 
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policy and practices, recognising the central role of teachers to the functioning of the 
system as a whole.  
 
Moreover, as Uwakwe et al (2008) argue, the shifting of the administrative burden 
through decentralised processes is likely to be affected by existing capacity on the 
ground and the reproductive effects for equity this has on low-income communities. 
Particularly in cases where private involvement extends to management processes, 
in the case of education weaker schools and communities may be subjected to 
increased monitoring, evaluation and intervention while better-performing schools 
enjoy more autonomy and flexibility (Prew et al, 2011). In other instances, where 
low-cost private education is an option, weaker public schools may lose learners to 
these schools based on the perception of improved learning through smaller class 
size and greater connections with staff (Uwakwe et al, 2008; Heyneman & Stern, 
2013). At multiple levels the governance of public schools is impacted by the 
intervention of the private sector based on the expectation of improved efficiency and 
managerial capacity and the decreasing ability of the state to respond to educational 
needs. It must be stated that decentralisation creates a ripe field for private interests 
where schools may benefit from individualised interventions, but that this cannot be 
read in isolation from the broader effects of this arrangement on equity and quality 
concerns.  
 
 
4.2. PPPs: shifting private sector involvement from the ancillary 
and parallel to the core of a public education system 
 
Private sector involvement in education varies in form and type, from constituting the 
semi- or full privatisation of state goods and services, or being contracted in to 
perform particular tasks in the provision of inputs (such as textbooks and teacher 
education), processes (operational services) or outputs (contracting schools to take 
on particular learners) (Patrinos et al, 2009). Patrinos et al (2009) in their report for 
the World Bank conceptualise a model of privatisation in education from ‘nascent’ or 
low privatisation to ‘integrated’ or high privatisation, where funding follows learners 
through interventions such as vouchers. On one end of the spectrum, government 
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both sets policy, provides resources and administers education – whether through 
the centralised government or at different devolved levels (such as provinces/states, 
prefectures, districts and circuits), including hiring teachers (Patrinos et al, 2009). On 
the opposite end, government is expected to set and enforce a policy terrain 
amenable to the expansion of private provision in education, with the view to 
maximising education delivery and performance while lowering costs (Patrinos et al, 
2009). There is an ideologically driven model which assumes that that the best forms 
of education provision are those in which private provides are integrated into the 
public education systems (they terms this integral). 
 
Interestingly the ideological shift that the WB signals is particularly what private 
sector groups are arguing for. In our reviews of Caerus Capital, a company 
specialising in Africa and South Asia, they note that the there is and should be a 
move from an ‘ancillary’ to ‘core’ role for the private sector. As can be seen, ancillary 
services discussed in this and other reviews have been part of private sector 
involvement in education provision for many years, including through discrete 
activities such as publishing. On the ‘core’ end of the market is the full provision of 
educational services across income brackets and learning stages.  
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4.3. Public private partnerships in education: Definitions and 
typologies 
 
Where PPPs have been used to develop education projects, manage schools or 
place poorer learners in private schools, a key point of concern in the nature of these 
partnerships has been ensuring resource maximisation. Bloom, Craig and Mitchell 
argue that education as a service is ‘fixed, standardised, and cumulative’ (2000: 18) 
with a mass element that gives institutions and individuals some measure of 
commonality in their needs and costs to the state. This indeed is one reason why 
education PPPs differ from health, in that there is some measure of predictability 
resulting in a greater potential for economies of scale. As discussed above, where 
individuals’ needs are not accommodated within the mainstream system, their 
education may be contracted to private providers in order to maximise their 
possibility of progression through the system with specialised education. Conversely, 
without targeted intervention by government, semi- or full privatisation can lead to 
the exclusion of marginalised learners who are either left in a hollowed-out public 
education system, left to low-quality private schools, or are denied access to 
education entirely (Lewin, 2007; Verger, 2012).  
 
As noted in the discussion above, there is rarely such a thing as a fully public 
education system in the global South, particularly where smaller forms of 
61 
 
privatisation have existed to supply education to particular sectors of society. These 
include mission schools (the precursor to many modern faith-based education 
providers) and community schools, established either by political organisations such 
as the Mau Mau in Kenya or through local organising initiatives. Furthermore, a fully 
public system is one where the state regulates, finances and provides for the total 
cost of education for all learners (Patrinos et al, 2009). This means that even in 
states with full public enrolment, private intervention in financing (such as through 
donor aid) constitutes a form of private intervention.  
 
Noting this we develop below a typology of types of private sector engagement in 
education which emerges from but is also a guide to our literature review. This 
analytical framework developed to assess particular forms of private sector 
intervention sees provision along a continuum different in different contexts. In the 
framework below we argue that the ‘PPP turn’ as we call it, speaks to a critical shift 
in the way public and private are conceptualised, where the institutionalisation and 
regularisation of partnerships blurs the boundaries between the public and private 
where this was previously upheld (Ball & Youdell, 2008). In the one end of the 
continuum of this framework is where the private sector engages in service provision 
such as textbooks or cleaning, and at the other end is where the private sector takes 
control over public schools through a process whereby the state contracts out the 
management of school to the private sector though a management contract, a 
process we call public provision contractualisms. 
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This model above follows that emerging private sector intervention in public 
education begins with the contracting out of particular (but ‘ancillary’) education 
services, such as curriculum materials, support services, and ICT resources. 
Publishing also features under education services. Vouchers and subsidies become 
another means through which private schools feature in public education, particularly 
where vouchers enable learners to choose between public and private schools. It is 
important to note that in the above model private schools are a broad category 
covering both for profit and not for profit providers, framed by:  
1. Different forms of ownership: community owned, individually owned  
2. Different orientations: secular, religious, particular value system or 
pedagogic approach 
3. Different forms of financing: grant aided, financially independent, 
sponsored by enterprises or political organisations, government subsidy, 
community. It is also critical to consider hidden and indirect forms of financing 
such as taxes and remittances. 
4. Different forms of regulation: registered, unregistered, tightly 
regulated, loosely regulated 
 
In the model above the semi-privatisation of public schools, which creates internal 
privatisation through particular policy and governance provisions that allow public 
schools to charge user fees. The integration of all these elements comes into play 
Education 
services 
Vouchers and 
subsidies 
pivate shcools: 
Low-cost 
private schools, 
gated,faith 
based, etc 
Semi-private 
public chools 
Public Private 
Partnerships 
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with public private partnerships, which contract the private sector into public schools 
to perform core functions under state oversight. It is in this order that the following 
discussion proceeds. The methodology of this review is first presented before a brief 
historicisation of private education in South Africa, before beginning the discussion of 
private sector intervention in education. 
 
 
4.4. Methodology 
This literature review is based on several database searches conducted monthly 
between February 2017 and February 2018. It draws together the findings of 
database and repository searches with results from studies by global and special 
interest bodies on private intervention in public education. The following 
methodology discusses criteria for resources included in the review as well as the 
process of collecting resources and limitations to the study. 
 
 
4.4.1. Criteria for Inclusion 
Due to the number of resources found for this review, comprehensive criteria for 
inclusion were required to ensure that literature was relevant to the topic and the 
context (South Africa, with a broader focus on the African continent). The shifting 
nature of private intervention in education over time meant that inclusion criteria also 
needed to account for long-term changes in public policy and the promulgation of 
global policy agendas. Criteria were adapted from Day et al (2014). 
 
CRITERIA FIRST SIFT SECOND SIFT 
Publication 
date 
Material published from 1994 
onwards (period of SA 
independence as well as growth 
of PPPs in global policy) 
Material published from 2007 
onwards (last decade) 
Relevance  Focus on privatisation and PPPs 
in education 
Focus on privatisation and 
PPPs in education in Africa, 
and specifically South Africa 
Location  (Mainly) global South; some Africa-focused 
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literature from low-income 
interventions in global North 
Quality  Readable, published by 
reputable source 
First sift criteria coupled with 
high-level analysis of data 
and/or development of 
theoretical debates 
 
The review focused on literature published between 1994 and 2017, the length of 
time since South Africa’s independence but also, importantly, the period during 
which PPPs saw a rise in significance in global policy agendas and later as 
developmental tools in the global South following the effects of structural adjustment 
(Languille, 2017). Useful texts with extensive bibliographies, such as Languille’s 
(2017) review of literature on privatisation in education and health in the global South 
and Day et al’s (2014) review in education, allowed for ‘snowballing’ other sources 
and analytical debates, ensuring both breadth and depth in our own process of 
literature collection. 
 
The first and second sifts also offered an opportunity to sort literature according to 
the existence of empirical data sets. While some first sift resources were discarded 
from the review, others were found to provide theoretical and conceptual insights 
that could inform the discussion of second sift resources, as many were empirically-
based studies and comprise 60% of the literature reviewed here. Second sift 
resources also focused on the African context, as initial results for searches on 
private intervention in education focused on Latin America and Asia.  
 
 
4.4.2. Directory searches  
Directories such as Google Scholar, JSTOR, and EBSCOHost were used to find 
relevant literature, further drawing from reference lists provided in articles. Key 
phrases used for directory searches include: 
Private 
education/schooling in 
Africa 
School choice Africa Variations of each search 
phrase referred either to 
‘in Africa’ or specific 
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Policy education PPP/ 
private 
Education funding private countries such as 
Uganda, Kenya and 
South Africa. ‘Education’ 
was also substituted for 
‘school’ or ‘schooling’ 
Education PPP Africa Education management 
private 
Privatisation in education Education governance 
private 
Parents education Africa Gender private education 
Africa 
 
Initial literature sourced from these searches amounted to over 180 resources. 
These were organised by date and then subjected to initial review, with at least 50 
removed for irrelevance or poor quality. A total of 130 sources including journal 
articles, theses, and institutional reports were then reviewed, and at least 80% 
(=104) of these reviewed thoroughly between February and September. The majority 
of the final sift sources are referenced in this review, and at least 10 more have 
informed the discussion if not referenced directly. Following from the first and second 
sift process above, to ensure temporal relevance 60% (=78) of the resources 
referenced in this review were published in the last decade. 
 
Journal titles consulted include: 
British Journal of Sociology of Education 
Education Management, Administration & Leadership 
Education Policy Analysis Archives 
Educational Evaluation & Policy Analysis  
International Journal of Educational Development 
International Review of Education 
Journal of Education Policy 
Journal of International & Comparative Social Policy 
Journal of Public Economics 
Social Philosophy & Policy 
World Development 
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Many reports on private education came from political, educational or intellectual 
bodies such as the World Bank, CfBT Education Trust, and the Institute for Futures 
Studies. These reports provided data on private interventions and privatisation 
coupled with methodologies and in most cases access to research instruments. 
Retroactively, the use of these mechanisms to determine rigor was coupled with an 
amended template of the kind developed by Day et al (2014) in their study of private 
schools in developing countries.  
 
 
4.4.3. Analysis of literature 
 
A useful resource in understanding the content of this review is an in-depth analysis 
of the literature used herein. This analysis proceeded by interrogating: 
 The nature of the publication [e.g. journal paper (including working papers); 
report (including other literature reviews); and books) 
 The size of the data sample, whether questionnaires, interviews or other 
forms of data collection. Sample size was determined by number of 
participants 
 The mode of data collection, whether quantitative, qualitative or mixed. This 
section also includes a variable ‘nodata’ for publications which do not rely on 
a primary data source, but either use bits of data for descriptive purposes or 
engage in theoretical, policy or analytical discussions. 
 The source of publication, whether from the global South or North. This 
section does not focus on the origin of authors but rather where work is 
produced from, arguing (as in the Conclusion section) that there is a Northern 
bias in the kinds of work and debates dominating current discourse on 
privatisation. 
All numerical references in this section are based on percentages calculated from 
the second sift material. 
 
4.4.4. Nature of publications 
The graph below indicates the proportion of publications referenced by type. 
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A few analytical notes can be made about the content of the publications addressed 
here. Firstly, there were several edited books used for this review. Some were based 
on empirical research conducted in the global South by Northern scholars and/or 
organisations, while others were largely analytical and theoretical in nature, 
contributing crucial insights to the kinds of interventions described below. Many of 
the chapters contained in the latter type had also been published in some form as 
journal submissions which had also been collected for the review, and so the 
decision was made to exclude the journal versions to avoid duplication in the 
numerical composition of the literature analysis. Furthermore, we assessed the 
content of other literature reviews used in this review, and while an in-depth analysis 
cannot be provided here, it must be noted that in the main these reviews largely 
relied on scholarship from the global North as well as work produced by Northern 
think-tanks.  
 
Mode of data collection 
The graph below describes the form of data collection used in the literature. It is 
crucial to note that 48% of the literature used in this review was not based on data 
analysis. 
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Despite the large number of reports and journal papers presented in this literature 
review many did not rely on data-driven work. This can be attributed to a portion of 
the literature that focused on analytical discussion on the mechanics of privatisation 
and different private interventions. It can also be attributed to the fact that data were 
largely used for descriptive purposes in many discussions, which we suggest is a 
critical limitation of current work on the topic of privatisation in that it does not take 
seriously the foundations of the kinds of data used to make empirical claims. This is 
especially true of work using household surveys to extrapolate information about 
trends in privatisation in education. As the section on sampling shows, the majority of 
data-driven publications used samples of >100 participants. This is largely 
attributable to the use of national and specialist household survey data and 
secondary data sources including UNESCO and World Bank data-sets. In fact, a 
large proportion of the data-driven studies in this literature review did not collect their 
own data, but relied on secondary data to form their analysis. A small number 
analysed the analysis of data sets by other researchers but did not engage these 
data sets directly. Furthermore, there were several reports by financial organisations 
identifying the profitability and business opportunities in education which lacked 
concrete data to substantiate their propositions. 
 
Sample size 
The table below describes the percentage of data-driven studies (52% of the 
literature) that used samples of greater or less than 100 participants. 
25% 
7% 
20% 
48% 
Data 
Quantitative Qualitative Mixed No data 
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As identified above, the larger sample sizes of the studies in this review derive in 
part from the use of secondary data, but there were also a few reports and journal 
publications that produced their own large-scale data sets. Some also merged 
household surveys and census data with qualitative research to probe the key points 
emerging from the larger data set. There were a number of publications that used 
data descriptively, but as these were not primarily rooted in a data-driven discussion 
they were excluded from the analysis of samples. 
 
Source of literature 
The graph below describes the proportion of literature according to source, i.e. from 
Southern or Northern sources. 
 
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
>100 <100 
Sample 
Sample 
South, 22% 
North, 78% 
Source of literature 
South North 
70 
 
The literature source was based on the site of publication and not the demographics 
of authors as these cannot always be verified to an acceptable degree. Moreover, 
there are many scholars from the global South working and writing in the global 
North and contributing to current debates on privatisation, but it is important to 
identify the audiences and spaces in which their work is disseminated. Many of the 
empirical work conducted in the global South was conducted by scholars originating 
from the North as well as located in Northern universities and think-tanks, while 
Southern scholars were either in collaboration with Northern scholars in their home 
countries – acting as ‘local informants’ on the context – or writing collaboratively with 
local peers and publishing in Southern publications. This is not a hard distinction, 
however, and caution must be taken in making these claims categorically. However it 
is important to flag the evident bias towards the global North in where this literature 
derives from as it mirrors the argument in the literature review about policy- and 
knowledge-borrowing from the North. 
 
4.4.5. Limitations 
The continental focus of this literature review meant that it was necessarily limited by 
the scope of countries that could be included in the discussion, even as similarities 
exist with other countries in the global South. While private interventions in education 
exist in different forms in Africa, critical literature on this phenomenon is still 
emerging and empirical findings illustrate a lack of agreement on the outcomes and 
efficacy of these interventions in implementation. Lack of information on the policy 
development and statutory agreements between government and private bodies 
impedes our ability to fully understand the networks, influences and mechanisms of 
private sector intervention.  
 
This literature review particularly flags gaps in currently available literature because 
the many systemic reviews by stakeholders such as the World Bank and counter-
positioning by researchers both focus on technical and not conceptual developments 
or problems in privatisation. However there are also important contributions by 
scholars included here that highlight where these gaps converge over a range of 
issues. A broader challenge of representation regards the Northern bias of literature 
on privatisation and indicates a need for endogenous scholarship on the conceptual, 
material and political implications of this phenomenon in the global South. 
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Finally at first glance, the particular educational context of South Africa does not 
follow the cases of countries such as Kenya and Uganda where low-cost private 
schooling is widespread, while at a macro-level there are similarities in the policy 
trajectories of many post-colonial African states. While the discussion focuses on the 
continental context it thus also hones in on the particularities of education provision 
and private intervention in the South African case. 
 
 
4.5. Historicising privatisation in education in Africa and South 
Africa 
 
The discussion has thus far sought to show that within the contemporary global 
context – which includes economic policy and global agendas such as the SDGs – it 
is assumed that education must inculcate learners into the future demands of the 
labour market while also instilling a national identity, especially in contexts of 
historical conflict or strife (Bloom, Craig & Mitchell, 2000). The political, economic 
and nationalist development of the post-colonial state arguably relies on a unified 
and unifying education system that inculcates the vision, values and goals of the new 
society, increasingly with respect to its position in a globalising world (Oketch & 
Rolleston, 2007). Increasingly, schooling needs to be both contextually relevant and 
globally up-to-date in order to offer learners the best chances in their future 
endeavours.  
 
As noted, private intervention in the public education system is not new, and takes 
different form in different states. Missionary or religious organisations provided early 
forms of private schooling in colonial states, and the initial massification of education 
systems in Africa either took place prior to or as a priority of independence in 
countries. Economic and political shifts have affected how these massification 
strategies have unfolded over time, and have come to intersect with global 
developments in policymaking, lending and agenda-setting. The first major 
intervention in respect of this review is, as mentioned previously, the structural 
adjustment programmes that characterised economic interventions in the global 
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South in the 1980s and 1990s by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(Ball & Youdell, 2008; Moutsios, 2009). These programmes advocated for greater 
liberalisation of developing economies with the promise of wealth ‘trickling down’ 
through the creation of a new middle class. What resulted was the creation of 
classes of comprador elites largely overseeing the transferral of state assets to 
private, and often foreign investors, amidst a breakdown in public service provision 
as welfare allocations were reduced (Moutsios, 2009). This substantively affected 
the nature and quality of education in affected countries, as countries under SAPs 
were encouraged to reduce education spending while prioritising technical and 
vocational training at the expense of the kinds of education interventions that were 
building the ‘knowledge economies’ of the global North at the same time (Ball & 
Youdell, 2008; Moutsios, 2009).  
 
‘Structural adjustment’ continues to hold negative connotations as a result of its 
failure to improve conditions for states party to the process, but in terms of 
expanding opportunities for private investors (especially from the global North) it can 
be considered quite successful (Hill, 2006; Verger, 2012). However, focusing solely 
on these large-scale interventions can miss some more subtle shifts that create 
foundations for future motion into the public sector. One example is the definition of 
education as a ‘service’ by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1998, which 
effectively opened up the market in education under the General Agreement on 
Trade and Services (GATS) (Moutsios, 2009). This dovetails and runs concurrent to 
the development of global policy agendas such as the Millennium Development 
Goals and later, Sustainable Development Goals, which feature key indicators in 
education as measures of developmental progress.  
 
Prominent in the realisation of these indicators is recognition of wider network of 
actors which includes, and indeed emphasises, the private sector and corporate 
intervention (Ball & Youdell, 2008; Verger, 2017). This has generated and 
perpetuated the global policy context that frames decision-making particularly for 
states affected by SAPs and dependent on international aid, donor funding and 
corporate participation in the management of education provision. 
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The expansion of access has been critical to the spread of education in the global 
South, but quality remains central to building a competitive workforce and generating 
social cohesion (McKenzie, 1993; Bloom, Craig & Mitchell, 2000; Lewin, 2007). 
Private providers may be suited to this role because the quality of their deliverables 
directly impacts their ability to attract wealthy and academically strong learner-
consumers, creating space for innovation and efficiency that can affect the quality of 
public provision (Bloom, Craig & Mitchell, 2000; Verger, 2012). However, their 
efficiency and cost reduction may adversely affect existing inequities, at least in the 
short term and particularly when there is insufficient support for those remaining in 
the public sector. In education, this means that there is a cap on the amount of 
resources that can be directed towards poorer sectors of the system. 
 
 In the South African case public schools receive a minimum subsidy per learner, 
with increased remittances on the basis of need, school location and immediate 
community income status. There is a racial element to this as the poorest schools 
are historically black, and the majority of wealthy schools historically white (with a 
small number of historically coloured and Indian schools included here), resulting 
from a historically bifurcated education system still affected by a lack of systemic 
redistribution in society (Sayed et al, 2017). The current allocation model is a 
redistributive mechanism intended to ensure that historically disadvantaged schools 
receive greater support to improve performance (particularly where parents cannot 
afford to pay school fees). The result is that it is the majority of historically black 
schools that are no-fee schools. 
 
On the other end of the public school system, wealthier schools that charge fees are 
able to extract revenue above state allocations that enhance their facilities and 
teaching capacity, with wealthier parents moving their children to these schools (and 
into private schools) on perception of better quality (Sayed et al, 2016). This leads to 
capital flight from poorer public schools as parents move their children ‘up’ levels 
through the racialised public system. Private intervention is viewed as a logical 
solution in light of this decreasing resource base (and expanding pool of vulnerable 
schools) due to its emphasis on efficiency, with the result that PPPs and similar 
policy mechanisms are an attempt to cover the ground between rich and poor 
schools by drawing private expertise into different elements of the running of poorer 
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schools. This solution, however, does not adequately respond to the foundational 
problems of the system: the racially differentiated resourcing of schools that 
continues to affect outcomes and attainment, and the opening up of the public 
education system to greater parental choice that continues to reflect and crystallise 
inequalities between schools and social groups. The small subsidy provided by the 
state to private schools within a particular income bracket is also intended as an 
equity measure, but as the discussion will show the measure of poverty used to 
determine which schools receive the subsidy is itself questionable. 
 
The consequence of this for the education system as a whole has been the concern 
of researchers (see Verger, 2012; Languille, 2017) who argue that the insertion of 
the private has long-term effects on the public good. South Africa is one example of 
the complexity in relations between public and private, and indeed other states face 
similar challenges even in different forms – such as in contexts where parents opt for 
low-cost private schooling as an alternative to an oversubscribed public system 
(Heyneman & Stern, 2013). We cannot ignore that parental choice plays an 
important role in the promotion and perpetuation of the private sector in education 
provision, and parents themselves are private actors in the public system (Ball & 
Youdell, 2008). Further, Brock-Utne (1995) suggests that specific cultural and 
economic conditionalities become central to the functioning of private providers 
which affects both the form and the content of education in vastly different contexts. 
Developing citizenship attitudes and responsibilities through public education is 
impeded by the intervention of different providers and institutional types with their 
own local, regional, and/or global interests, and how these are brought to bear on 
partnership arrangements and inputs (Brock-Utne, 1995). Where parental choice 
becomes influential in the choices schools make in developing and/or perpetuating 
particular socio-cultural conditionalities, or where private providers spring up as a 
response to the educational needs of exclusive segments of society, questions about 
citizenship, social justice and education become especially important. In the South 
African context, race and school quality have been invariably conflated, further 
exacerbating existing inequalities in the post-apartheid system. 
 
The previous sections have described PPPs as complex relationships between 
public good and profit-making; innovation and tradition; efficiency and bureaucracy, 
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and a series of other apparent binaries. However, what the discussion has attempted 
to show are the nuanced ways in which state and private entities negotiate their 
interests in cooperation and collaboration, sharing knowledge and expertise in order 
to maximise returns on public projects and services. Critically, consumer politics has 
infiltrated responses to state service provision such that efficiency, accountability and 
high performance are expected from public goods and services in similar ways to the 
way consumers build brand loyalties, expect warranties on particular goods, and 
hold private firms to particular standards of services (Paoletto, 2000). Partnerships 
consolidate these expectations because the different constituencies represented by 
collaborators must be taken into account in order for the intervention to remain 
feasible and operational. Examples of the types of institutional forms incorporating 
private interests in education are discussed further below. 
 
 
4.6. Types of PPP 
 
In this section we review the literature about types and forms of PPPs deriving from 
the framework outlined earlier.  
 
4.6.1. Education services 
Private investment in public education has commonly occurred through large private, 
corporate and/or multinational donors funding targeted interventions such as 
textbooks or extra-school academic programmes (Besharati, 2015). Besharati (2015) 
suggests that private donors have contributed significantly to education in South 
Africa and enabled the DBE to direct additional resources and support to schools 
that need this. Ball and Youdell (2008) consider this to form part of a wider and older 
trend of contracting out services to the private sector which takes place in a number 
of countries in both the global North and South. 
 
Partnerships with companies in particular sectors have often closely aligned with 
their business interests, such that for example mining, mineral and engineering 
companies fund maths and science interventions, telecommunications providers 
offer technological support and equipment, and media houses provide printed 
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learning resources as inserts (Besharati, 2015). In fact, ‘between 2005 and 2012… 
education constituted between 35 to 43 percent of [Corporate Social Investment] in 
South Africa… [with] only 30% of corporate spending being channelled via 
government institutions’ (Besharati, 2015). Bhanji (2012) argues that inasmuch as 
corporate initiatives may emphasise altruistic motives, they are primarily concerned 
with the expansion of commercial interests through acquisition of better-skilled 
labour or introducing products to new markets. In her research on Microsoft’s 
Partners in Learning (PiL) programme, which offers software, training and support to 
schools in about 114 countries, she finds that technological entrepreneurs and 
multinationals are able to tap into these emerging markets because of the increasing 
demand for ICT skills as a function of the ‘knowledge economy’ (Bhanji, 2012). 
Indeed, in Nigeria competition has erupted over the ‘One Laptop per Child’ (OLPC) 
initiative where Intel and Microsoft have challenged the provision of ‘subnotebooks’ 
run on the open-source Linux operating system. The Intel/Microsoft alternative is 
more expensive, and though initially offered for free as part of the rival initiative, 
critics have questioned the long-term impact of establishing high-cost ICT provision 
within the system (Ball & Youdell, 2008).  
 
Several policy mechanisms have been introduced that support business investment 
in education, such as tax incentives offered to companies that invest in critical social 
development areas and preferential procurement of state business, as well as the 
public listing of companies’ corporate social responsibility performance in an index 
such as that of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Besharati, 2015). These 
interventions differ from the semi-privatisation of public schools because they do not 
impact on the governance, decision-making and/or long-term resourcing of a school 
in the same way. Rather, they offer specific support that should free up or ease 
demands on limited school budgets. A criticism of ‘parallel provision’ by private and 
public providers is that changes in funding allocation and resourcing can affect the 
long-term delivery of particular services to vulnerable schools, compounding existing 
inequalities (Besharati, 2015). 
 
Another critique of service provision by private entities relates to the manner in which 
this fragments the delivery of a unified education system. For example, teacher 
professional development programmes offered by a range of NGOs bring in different 
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ideological, pedagogical and practical imperatives to what a national education 
system may require or promote (Ball & Youdell, 2008). Curriculum materials sourced 
from other countries can influence the social imperative of a country’s education 
system, with an example being the provision of e-learning materials by South African 
providers to the Ethiopian education system. This results in what Dhalstrom (2006) 
calls ‘cross-cultural cloning’, where the values of an Anglocentric education system 
come into contact with, and disrupt, local values, modes of being and ways of 
learning.  
 
 
4.6.2. Vouchers and subsidies 
 
Lockheed and Jimenez (1994) argue that there are three main objectives that private 
intervention in education can serve. Firstly, private education can respond to 
shortages and gaps in public provisioning, expanding access and responding to 
local needs. Secondly, because private providers must respond to immediate 
demands of the school community, they can arguably provide a better fit and 
quality of education that makes them competitive with the public sector 
(Lockheed & Jimenez, 1994), driving improvement on either end. Third, and related 
to this, is that private providers can try out new approaches and models in the 
running of schools that could guide improvements in public schools (with reduced 
liability to the public system if interventions fail) (Lockheed & Jimenez, 1994). 
 
Important to note in these objectives is the manner in which the public system is 
positioned as performing at an inadequate rate relative to the needs of the 
population. Particularly with reference to the last two objectives, the underlying 
assertion is that public schools are not directly accountable to their ‘consumer’ base, 
specifically learners and parents, especially where much of the cost of education is 
borne by the state (Broekman, 2013). Vouchers are one mode of transferring 
accountability based on the rationale that this will drive improvements in quality: 
schools will have to compete, through high and ongoing performance, for learners 
who receive the state endowment that would ordinarily have been a block grant to 
the school (Patrinos et al, 2009). In this way parental (and learner) choice drives a 
market-place of schools competing for funding. 
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Vouchers can be implemented in several ways: as a universal voucher system 
(where all learners receive vouchers to attend schools of their choice); as a targeted 
voucher or scholarship system (to provide schooling to learners from low-income 
backgrounds); and as an equity-based subsidy mechanism, where private schools 
receive a per-learner subsidy if they abide by particular equity requirements. The 
latter is currently in place in Uganda and South Africa, and will be discussed in this 
section. 
 
A universal voucher system is currently synonymous with the Chilean education 
model, which views that giving families vouchers to purchase education for their 
children stimulates competition between public and private education providers (as 
both are eligible recipients of vouchers in the system) (Verger et al, 2016). At present 
about 90% of all Chilean learners access their education through this system with 
the exception of learners attending fully-private, fee-paying schools. Vouchers have 
also been touted as a desirable reform mechanism of the education agenda for 
South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (Sayed, van Niekerk & 
du Plessis, 2018), which currently operates the ‘Collaboration Schools’ private 
management pilot in the province it governs (more in the respective section). 
 
In Kenya, Jamaica and Tanzania, Heyneman and Stern (2013) note a trend towards 
either targeted vouchers and scholarships for learners from poor backgrounds, or 
cross-subsidization of learners through low-cost private schools which give 
discretionary bursaries and remittances to parents that cannot afford fees. Day et al 
(2014) and Verger et al (2016) caution that voucher systems cannot be assumed to 
function better than public education provision due to a number of factors that 
influence their success. A strong voucher system relies on sufficient and transparent 
information available for parents to make choices about the schools their children 
attend; and a strong regulatory environment that exists to ensure that the benefits of 
the system are not skewed by learner selectivity and circumvention of the funding 
model (such as through charging additional fees) (Verger et al, 2016). In Chile and in 
other cases, schools do have the option to charge an additional fee, though above a 
certain threshold stand to see a reduction in their voucher value (Ball & Youdell, 
2008; Patrinos et al, 2009; OECD, 2012; Verger et al, 2016). There are evident 
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equity implications inherent in this, particularly where private expansion in the 
education ‘market’ results in stratification within a model intended to promote choice, 
equity and access. In cases where targeted vouchers are provided, higher learner 
attainment and further education has been reported (Patrinos et al, 2009), however 
in this case it is questionable what impetus the public sector has to expand to 
improve quality for the low-income market where, instead, it could contract this out to 
private providers. 
 
A further example of ‘vouchers’ in a different form is the subsidisation of private 
schools, which occurs in countries such as Uganda and South Africa. Private 
schools can access a state subsidy where they adhere to particular equity 
requirements, such as catering to a particular income group and setting fees below a 
certain threshold. In Uganda, this resulted from the need to expand secondary 
school provision from a limited fiscal base (Brans, 2013). Entering into partnerships 
with the large number of existing private schools (including for-profit schools) allowed 
the government to commit more to per-learner subsidies, rather than targeting 
spending at building more schools or directly paying teacher salaries (as these costs 
were the remit of private providers) (Brans, 2013). It is interesting to note that in 
common understanding of PPPs, Uganda’s would be considered a form of 
‘contracting out’ through paying the private sector for education services – it is not a 
‘classic’ type of subsidy because schools are not allowed to charge additional fees. 
However it could be seen as something of a voucher-subsidy hybrid, as learners are 
able to enter private schools after passing the minimum requirements of their 
Primary Leaver’s Exam, and the fixed capitation grant to schools is calculated on a 
per-learner basis (Brans, 2013). With a significant portion of its secondary education 
spend going towards private schools, the regulatory capacity of the Ugandan 
government to ensure quality and equity is key. Brans’s (2011) research, as well as 
Chapman (2010), shows that this capacity is currently lacking: because the state 
cannot effectively enforce its monitoring and oversight role, it cannot hold private 
providers accountable, and by extension learners, parents and teachers are 
rendered vulnerable (Brans, 2013).  
 
The regulation and constitution of state support for private schools differs from 
country to country, with some either lacking or not enforcing regulations on 
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independent schools, and others enforcing a coherent policy architecture to ensure 
oversight and quality management (CDE, 2015). In South Africa provision is made 
for parents’ right to choose independent schools for their children and some 
independent (particularly non-profit) schools are eligible for state funding of up to 
60% of the public school subsidy.  
 
South African history towards private schools is contested to say the least; 
historically, at the inception of democracy, some private schools were regarded as 
being progressive (McKenzie, 1993; Soudien, 2012). Yet on the cusp of the 
transition there were raging internal debates about the status of private schools in 
relation to concerns around equity and provision (Kallaway, 1989; McKenzie, 1993). 
Initially the ANC government refused to fund private schools but following negotiation 
this was written out of its policy proposals during the transition to democracy. This 
matter was resolved in sub section 29(3) of the Constitution: 
‘(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that: 
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race; 
(b) are registered with the state; and 
(c) maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public 
educational institutions. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent educational 
institutions.’ 
The result is that South Africa has taken a progressive steering or what some would 
say is a potentially pro-poor approach (Sayed, 2017). This model is characterised by:  
 Conditional grant systems based on equity/social redress and quality 
grounds  
 State oversight of such schools through the registration process and through 
funding 
 Adherence to the state curriculum, although this can be bypassed 
 
While the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) found that a quarter of the 
low-fee private schools in its South African study were unregistered, in the main it 
suggests that nationally a strong regulatory environment exists for independent 
schools that often holds them to a standard that some public schools may not even 
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be capable of attaining (CDE, 2015). This is to ensure that parents and learners are 
not exploited and that a desirable standard is maintained across the schooling 
system; independent schools can lose their subsidies, be de-registered or even be 
closed for poor performance. There is a need for better disaggregated data on public 
and private schools in South Africa in order to ascertain the landscape of current 
education provision in the country, because currently estimates vary on the size and 
growth rate of independent schools (CDE, 2015), and as such the below statistics on 
the size of the sector are contested. It is also important to note that, compared to 
other parts of the continent, the literature on low-fee (particularly informal) private 
schools in South Africa is still emergent. 
 
 
In 2014, there were about 25 741 schools of which 1681 (6.5%) were independent – 
a growth of about 110 schools from 2013. This compares to a CDE (2013) estimate 
of 2500, a significant discrepancy of 929 or almost double the DBE’s number.  
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The demographic of learners in unregistered schools has critical implications for 
equity in the context of ongoing, racialised inequalities (Bray et al, 2010; Sayed et al, 
2016). The impact of regulation on the scope of low-cost private schools is 
influenced by institutional and managerial contexts and is not a challenge confined to 
South Africa. Where, for example, community-based private schools have access to 
limited resources to secure accreditation and subsidisation, school conglomerates 
come with private backing and knowledge of the policy architecture that enables 
them to position themselves in the market (CDE, 2015). In the South African context 
the independent school sector is growing from a relatively small base compared to 
the rapid expansion of low-fee private schooling in other countries CDE, 2015). The 
CDE posits that less than 1% of provincial education budgets (with the exception of 
Gauteng at 1.45%) in South Africa is used to subsidise qualifying private schools, 
freeing up more resources for public schools than if those private schools had 
become part of the public sector (CDE, 2015). However, it also found that the ‘low-
fee’ market in the country is also best characterised as a mid-fee market offering 
private alternatives costing upwards of R12 000 per annum. This means that even 
though the subsidy available to private schools is intended to improve equity in the 
setting of fees (thus widening access), most are still out of reach for the poorest 
members of society. 
 
Vouchers and subsidies represent a crucial reform mechanism that stand to 
establish the centrality of the private sector in public education provision, as public 
money is directed towards funding or partial funding of private schools. In emergent 
private markets such as South Africa, this may not represent a large dent in the 
existing spend on public education, but the Chilean case shows that where vouchers 
come to drive education choice and market development, the extrication of the 
system from reliance on the private sector becomes difficult (Verger et al, 2016). 
This creates further space for private interests to pressure the state for greater 
support and policy inclusion, while also creating quality stratification between public 
and private schools where private providers are able to draw on increased capital 
input from donors, shareholders and business interests. The previous discussion on 
education services, and the following on low-cost private school chains, should be 
noted for the link between school chain conglomerates and other private service 
providers. A network analysis on school conglomerates and education service 
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providers has been conducted for education in the global North, but an identifiable 
(and necessary) gap in existing education literature on the global South is a similar 
mapping of the relationship between multinational and national corporate interests in 
education. 
 
 
4.7. Private schools 
 
In this section we focus on particular types of private school. We divide the 
discussion into those which are low cost and those which we argue can be 
categorised as elite serving the emerging middle class and wealthy in South Africa. 
The section begins with a discussion of low cost private schools, including school 
chains. 
 
4.7.1. Low-cost private schools 
 
Heyneman and Stern (2013) offer two reasons for the growth of low-cost private 
schooling in the global South: firstly, inadequate provisioning of state schooling, 
especially to vulnerable groups in society, and secondly poor quality education as 
a result of inefficiencies or shortages in the public education system. In post-
colonial states where indigene education was not prioritised, education for Africans 
became an aspirational lever, and differentiated education quality resulted in labour 
stratification in the economy (Oketch & Rolleston, 2007). Expanding access 
becomes a necessary ideological intervention following independence, as education 
becomes synonymous with development. However the following discussion will show 
that it has particular effects on equity when the public system is not equipped to cope 
with the rapidity of new enrolments. 
 
One effect is that under contemporary circumstances a struggling public education 
system has resulted in a stream at both high and low income levels towards different 
kinds of private schools in a range of African states. Where wealthier families have 
had the option to enrol their children in exclusive private schools, newer institutional 
forms are geared towards low-income families and use a range of strategies to 
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attract them from the public education system (Heyneman & Stern, 2013). The 
following discussion broadly distinguishes between small-scale, locally-run and –
funded community schools and large-scale education corporations that build school 
conglomerates, or provide funding, resources or support to local private (or public) 
schools.  
 
Low cost community schools 
Oketch and Rolleston (2007) contribute an interesting discussion on the evolution of 
education policies in East Africa with particular focus on Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. They argue that education became synonymous with development as a 
result of the global shifts indicated above as well as local political dynamics that 
emphasised the centrality of schooling to the vision of the new nation (Oketch & 
Rolleston, 2007). Expanding access to public education became an important 
ideological as well as developmental strategy. However, they problematize the 
emphasis on basic education in current global agendas and the relevance of this 
emphasis to an increasingly specialised global labour market, arguing that ignoring 
the structural and social dynamics influencing access and retention results in 
reduced long-term benefit and increased inequality. The following discussion will 
reflect on this position in relation to the literature. 
 
One example of this can be found in the work of Nishimura and Yamano (2012), who 
argue that an unexpected result of the Universal Primary Education (UPE) MDG goal 
may in fact have been the growth of low-cost private schools in places like Kenya. 
They suggest that overcrowding in free public schools, and slow expansion of the 
existing system, resulted in the ‘siphoning off’ of parents and learners with a few 
more resources available to them (Nishimura & Yamano, 2012). Private sector 
schooling in this context fulfils an ‘excess demand’ role in responding to a gap left by 
the public education system, in this case low-cost, often low-quality schooling 
(Nishimura & Yamano, 2012).  
 
In the Kenyan case, the number of private schools quadrupled between 2002 (= 
1441) and 2005 (= 5857), with parents of children in these schools claiming they 
offered better discipline, teaching quality and desirable learner to teacher ratios 
(about 1:20 compared to 1:60 in public schools) (Tooley, Dixon & Stanfield, 2008; 
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Nishimura & Yamano, 2012). Another consideration for parents was the discretion 
principals of these schools accorded to the payment of fees and the relaxing of 
restrictions on uniform (Tooley, Dixon & Stanfield, 2008). While public education may 
be ‘available’, coupled with the cost-sharing policy of the Kenyan education system 
that encourages fee paying, the hidden costs of public schooling influences its 
attractiveness (Patrinos et al, 2009). Hidden costs include actual hours of teaching 
time, class size and its influence on individual attention, uniforms and so forth. 
 
In cases where public schooling is either free or highly subsidised, the issue of 
education as a public good is affected by the rationale of choice and value 
maximisation where private providers exist for particular aspects of the market. For 
example, while ‘low cost’, the cost of education in small community private schools is 
borne primarily by parents, creating a drain on local finances (Oketch & Rolleston, 
2007; Heyneman & Stern, 2013). It contributes to the stratification between income 
groups as learners from middle class and wealthy families are already able to 
exercise their choice over private education and divert resources into these 
institutions. With low-income families now able to exercise the same choice, the 
drain of already scarce resources from poorer public schools threatens the 
attainment of the learners left behind (Nishimura & Yamano, 2012; Heyneman & 
Stern, 2013).  
 
In Uganda, learners’ families bore up to 80% of the cost of education prior to the 
effecting of UPE, and thereafter there was a shift of financial responsibility to 
government to cover the costs. The need for ‘top-ups’ to low quality public education 
means that education quality was determined by private resources and stratified by 
income level (Nishimura, Yamano & Sasaoka, 2008). Oketch and Rolleston (2007) 
refer to this as ‘access shock’ where, similar to Kenya, the public system is not 
equipped to respond to the exponential demand for enrolments as education 
becomes free or subsidised. While top-ups are one means of cost-sharing between 
the state and parents, they also create a situation in which parents have to be 
strategic about the annual spend on schooling per family. The result is that some 
learners (such as girls) are taken out of school, or sent to lower-quality schools as 
resources are diverted towards boys or more academically proficient siblings. The 
availability of low-cost schooling may also lead to greater instability in enrolments as 
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these become dependent on income and the availability of funds to send children to 
these schools (Lewin, 2007; Day et al, 2014). 
 
It is necessary to understand how the introduction of UPE and EFA in contexts 
without the necessary policy and/or structural capacity can produce patterns of 
inequality as excess demand comes into effect. If access to education expands 
before the market can absorb and organise the increased inflow, adverse effects on 
inequality can be expected as the value of specialisation increases and secondary 
and tertiary education become even more aspirational than they currently are 
(Kallaway, 1989; Kimenyi, Mwabu & Manda, 2006; Oketch & Rolleston, 2007). 
Unemployment and job instability affect the both the cost and the value of education 
such that existing inequalities both in and outside the education system can affect 
enrolment and retention.  
 
Moreover, political dynamics may affect the ability of certain groups of learners to 
access schooling. While basic education is enshrined as a fundamental and 
inalienable human right, accessing education for refugee and migrant learners in 
South Africa comes with bureaucratic challenges, policy friction, and xenophobia in 
some cases (Sayed et al, 2016). In other states education may be affected by 
inequalities of gender, ethnicity or language (Brock-Utne, 1995; Oketch & Rolleston, 
2007). In this regard low-cost private schooling acts as an intervention against 
systemic inequalities and either a ‘way out’ of using state services or a ‘last resort’ 
for citizens that struggle to make claims against the state and hold it accountable. 
The relationship between low-cost schooling and equity is discussed further in the 
section to follow. 
 
Srivastava (2016) argues that the growth of education as a marketplace backed by 
corporate finance and global capitalism is characteristic of a ‘second wave’ in 
governance that brings new actors, agendas and interests into the national 
education landscape. Reaching the goal of universal access and improved quality in 
education occurs in the context of increased budgetary constraints for countries in 
the global South, with the result that the excess demand discussed above comes 
into effect. 
 
87 
 
Challenges for low-cost private schools: a space for school chains? 
While greater accountability may drive the tendency towards private schooling in the 
low-income market, low-cost schools have their own set of challenges. In cases 
where these develop out of community or philanthropic initiatives, resources may be 
stretched in order to accommodate more learners, including a percentage that 
cannot pay full or any fees (Heyneman & Stern, 2013). The authors cite cases in 
Kenya, Jamaica and Tanzania where redistributive mechanisms such as vouchers or 
cross-subsidization through fee paying learners enable more learners from low-
income families to access private schooling, also seen in the Ugandan case where 
rather than vouchers government directly pays the fees of learners to private schools 
(Brans, 2013). On the other end, profit-seeking schools may not be able to offer as 
many concessions, which makes them unlikely to be able to serve the poorest or 
most marginalised in society (Lewin, 2007). In this sense, systems that are not 
adequately developed to accommodate the changes resulting from privatisation will 
not benefit from the efficiency or competitiveness attached to marketization (Lewin, 
2007). A new challenge may be the role of the government as a ‘last resort’ provider 
of low-quality public education as private providers come to offer education for 
different income levels. 
 
Another challenge that is alluded to in the provision of education by so many actors 
is the problem of standardisation, quality, and throughput. It is uncertain whether 
low-cost schooling promises comparably better results than public schools, as the 
results of studies have been mixed, or positive without this being directly linked to 
the school’s status as private (Heyneman & Stern, 2013; Day et al, 2014). Even 
while Day et al (2014) do find some positive evidence of learner performance in 
private schools, they caution that current research may not necessarily extend into 
the range of private providers and the diverse learner cohort these providers serve. It 
also does not control for the range of other factors that influence learner attainment 
(Day et al, 2014). More to this point, differing degrees of regulation mean that in 
some countries low cost schools may not be mandated to write a national exam or 
equivalent, with serious implications for equity and throughput of any gains made in 
these schools (Brock-Utne, 1995; Oketch & Rolleston, 2007). As Day et al (2014) 
find, enrolment in public secondary schools may be more elusive for learners in low-
cost private schools in states such as Kenya, potentially reversing any gains in 
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learning and retention for those who have ‘exited’ the public system at the primary 
level. 
 
Low-fee school chains are argued to reduce some of the risks posed by community 
schools, particularly where they have to conform to regulations on independent 
schools in order to access accreditation and/or subsidies from government (CDE, 
2015). International chains such as Bridge International Academies (BIA) are funded 
by a combination of private donors and international development funds, and offer 
low-fee private education in countries like India, Uganda and Nigeria. Like SPARK 
Schools, a South African private school chain which uses a blended learning model, 
BIA rely on new technologies to keep school costs low and learning innovative (CDE, 
2015). The SPARK Schools website (2017) says that: ‘SPARK Schools 
individualises learning through our blended learning model, which combines teacher-
led instruction and computer-based instruction in our Learning Lab. Our model is the 
first of its kind for primary school students in Africa. The software SPARK scholars 
use is adaptive, allowing for highly individualised student practise and assessment’.  
 
This may reduce the cost and quality of professionals required to teach learners if 
technology comes to replace some of the functions of teachers (Languille, 2016). 
However, this also brings into question the consistent onslaught against the 
centrality of the teaching profession that critics (Ball & Youdell, 2008; Verger et al, 
2013; Robertson et al, 2012; Verger et al, 2016) consider to be a hallmark of the 
current privatisation agenda. This critique will be engaged in the conclusion of the 
review. It is also important to note the relationship between ICTs and new school 
conglomerates, which positions a range of private interests in relation to each other. 
 
While older, non-profit school chains exist, newer ones may be publicly listed 
companies or emerging for-profit chains that charge higher fees than low-cost 
schools such as LEAP which are aimed at attracting high-performing, low-income 
learners (CDE, 2015). This means that the ‘low-fee’ school chain market could in fact 
be populated by intermediate and middle-income families rather than the poorest, 
who continue to be served by weaker public schools or, for a small segment, private 
schools (whether informal, formal fee-paying or bursary-offering). Older chains may 
also not be able to expand as rapidly as education conglomerates or for-profit chains 
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due to their more limited resource capacity. The table below notes key private 
education providers in South Africa and their target markets. 
 
(Adapted from CDE, 2015) 
The implication is that the innovation and accountability posited as a benefit of low-
fee private chains is lost on the segment of the education sector that could 
theoretically most benefit from it (Languille, 2016). Thus, while the CDE (2015) holds 
that increasing subsidies to private schools could encourage them to drop their fees, 
research by the OECD (2012) suggests that this is not guaranteed to result in equity 
where stratification already exists in the schooling market. As seen above, the 
presence of low-fee providers indicates a demand for these in the market, but in the 
PRIVATE PROVIDER TARGET MARKET
PUBLICALLY LISTED COMPANY
AdvTech
high-income (proposals to 
move into low-fee market, as 
well as private tertiary 
education
Curro
intermediate- and middle-
income; bursaries offered to 
4% of learners
FOR PROFIT CHAIN
Reddam House high-income
SPARK Schools
intermediate-income at 
present, but with plans to 
move into low-fee market as 
the brand expands
Prestige College low- to middle-income
NOT FOR PROFIT CHAIN
Vuleka intermediate-income
Get Ahead Project low-income
BASA Educational Institute Trust low-income
Summit Education South Africa high-income
LEAP Schools low-income
2 Oceans Education Foundation low-income
The Love Trust low-income
African School of Excellence low-income
Pioneer Academies middle-income
Royals Management Company intermediate-income
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context of a growing awareness of profitability in the education market and the turn 
towards investing in profit-seeking providers. 
 
4.7.2. Elite schooling 
 
The school types discussed below form part of the basic education sector in South 
Africa (and on the continent more generally) but remain under-researched as forms 
of education provision. They form a significant part of the private education market, 
and in the case of religious schools form part of the ethos of some public schools but 
with specific regulatory caveats. These constitute a form of ‘parallel provision’ that 
does not directly compete with public education but provides educational services to 
niche markets. 
 
Van Zanten (2009) provides a useful discussion of the sociological factors 
underpinning the persistence of elite, usually private schools in France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. While these differ contextually from African states, 
elite education under colonialism followed similar models that sought to entrench a 
privileged overclass (van Zanten, 2009). As such the curricula and social cultures of 
elite schools are modelled on the particular spaces that learners are expected to 
occupy in society and the accompanying social capital this will require. A key reason 
for the emergence of private schools is thus the notion of differentiated demand, but 
as an area of research these schools have not received the same focus in the 
literature as low-income schooling (or may not have been as willing to be 
researched). It is important to understand the ‘class wall’ created by the perpetuation 
of high-income schooling in the contemporary knowledge economy, and moreover 
how equity and quality can be foregrounded in future education interventions when 
part of the education market is sectioned off. The tighter connections between elite 
private schools, private wealth and the market puts learners at these schools at a 
greater initial advantage in further education and job opportunities to their peers in 
other contexts (Lockheed, Jimenez & Paqueo, 1991; Lockheed & Jimenez, 1994; 
van Zanten, 2009). Indeed, Mundy and Menashy (2012) note that elite schools in 
former colonies were key recipients of endowments from international funders in the 
past, and continue to receive funds as a result of high-profile alumni and donor 
networks that perpetuate their exclusivity. 
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Gated community schools 
Curro Schools in South Africa have established several schools within or near gated 
security complexes, a popular housing option for middle- to high-income families. 
The tendency towards private communities by the wealthy has implications for the 
social compact but moreover creates ground for private provision of health and 
education in these clusters, resulting in middle- to high-income families opting out of 
most public services. While the growth rate of this school type has been slow and not 
covered in either academic work or media reports, as a phenomenon it merits 
attention for its implications for citizenship and the creation of ‘wealth bubbles’ within 
but external to the state and its functions. 
 
Home schooling 
A form of private schooling is when individual parents withdraw their children from all 
forms of public schooling and elect to educate their children at home. The debates 
around home schooling query its relationship to the public good and its elevation of 
private interests, as well as the class, race and faith dimensions informing the 
demographics of families electing this alternative. Home-schooling in South Africa 
was illegal under the apartheid government but provided for within the new 
democratic dispensation. However, statistics on the size of the sector are unreliable 
and veer between 50 000 learners and 400 000, and the registration and oversight of 
the home-schooling sector has been found lacking (Arai, 1999; Lubienski, 2000; 
Aurini & Davies, 2005). Because of the view of home-schooling as an ‘alternative’ 
form of education reduced down to individual providers (parents), it is unclear what 
new research is available on the phenomenon in South Africa, as most of the 
literature found was dated pre-2005. 
 
Faith-based schooling 
Schools in South Africa are allowed to observe religious rites under specific 
conditions, namely: 
‘Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, 
provided that: 
a) Those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities; 
b) They are conducted on an equitable basis; and 
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c) Attendance at them is free and voluntary’ (SA Constitution, 1996) 
 
A recent judgement also found that schools could not identify with and promote one 
religious identity at the expense of others. School governing bodies are mandated to 
decide a religious policy that is commensurate with the dynamic needs of the school 
community, and should be willing to adapt this as necessary. Faith-based schooling 
has formed one aspect of the differentiated demand in the South African market, and 
it is critical to further research the effects of this on broader attitudes to citizenship 
and equity. McKenzie’s research (1993) at the turn of democracy cautioned that the 
non-racialism of historic religious (particularly Catholic and Anglican) schools should 
not be read in separation from these schools’ ties to ‘the New Right’ or interrelated 
networks of local and global capital. 
 
Forms of parallel provision are not seen as a significant encroachment on broader 
equity and quality concerns when these primarily service niche interests. The view 
emerging from the available literature on these forms suggest that their primary 
driver is parental choice, which may be motivated by religious, cultural or social 
concerns (as well as class, in the case of elite private schools). There are also niche 
pedagogical schools such as Waldorf and Montessori which promote a particular 
kind of teaching and learning approach, and in the South African case these are also 
part of a middle- to higher-income education market. However, it is important to flag 
this provision for its separation of learners and their families from the public 
education system, and the ‘opting out’ from public services that these schools offer – 
indicative of a wider public opinion in many states that the public sector is inefficient 
or a poor service provider, and private providers are ‘better’ for individual needs and 
tastes (McDonald & Ruiters, 2012). The public sector is not exempt from this critique, 
however: in cases where progressive policy and unequal contexts meet, the semi-
privatisation of public education takes place through the charging of user fees, which 
compounds inequality within a supposedly public system. The following discussion 
takes up this concern. 
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4.8. Semi-private public schools 
The discussion has thus far drawn out cases of privatisation in education particularly 
in the low-income stream. Arguably the neo-privatisation of education in the low-
income bracket poses an interesting point to the nature of PPPs and the traditional 
relationship between private money and the education of elites (Van Zanten, 2009). 
In wealthier, often old private or public schools, the state grant (if any) is secondary 
to the high fees and endowments received from parents, business and alumni – 
creating an internal private partnership that steers school governance and spending, 
is able to influence uniform and admissions policies, and enables the school to act 
autonomously and in its best interests rather than directly under the ambit of the 
state.  
 
Some former Model C schools have retained this ability in the South African context, 
and the quintile system does indeed diminish the autonomy of poorer, no-fee schools 
as these come under the administration of the state and its contracted suppliers and 
services (Hofmeyr & Lee, 2004; Lewis & Motala, 2004). In this system quintiles 1-3 
schools receive a greater per-learner subsidy as well as state allocation of funds for 
teachers and services, but are not allowed to fundraise or charge fees. Quintiles 4 
and 5 schools receive lower subsidies but are free to charge fees and fundraise, 
which in fact grants greater access to private money (through parents paying fees 
and donations) to employ more teachers, offer more services, and improve 
infrastructure and learning. This is important because it makes evident the distinction 
between wealthier schools as privatised for the purposes of autonomy, and poorer 
schools privatised for the sake of governmentality – to correct errant, deviant, and 
deficient experiences of schooling, to optimise discipline and efficiency, and remedy 
the failures of state provisioning. However, wealthier institutions have also come 
under scrutiny for not adhering to Constitutional values in their engagements with 
learners, suggesting that regulatory mechanisms should become a priority as these 
educational opportunities expand to accommodate learners from marginalised 
communities (Lewis & Motala, 2004). 
 
In this instance the fee/no-fee distinction in the system and its implications for 
governance, and the range of fee levels at fee-paying schools, creates a stratified 
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semi-privatisation of schools within the system (Fiske, 2000). The ‘quintile-hopping’ 
(Fataar, 2015) phenomenon that sees more resourced learners moving to better 
schools also results in learners with less available resources left in historically, and 
subsequently less resourced local schools. Race and class inequalities are hardened 
in a context where wealthier schools are able to exercise greater freedom over their 
governance and budgets, while poorer schools are brought under government 
control while also struggling to mobilise limited local resources for their improvement 
(Fiske, 2000). Indeed, even in cases where these schools have full governing 
bodies, principals still exercise greater control over the running and administration 
than parents do because they are not the primary source of school funds (Lewis & 
Motala, 2004). Particular policies, such as the South African Schools’ Act, have 
enabled this environment as the decentralisation of governance can be used to 
maximum effect by schools with the wherewithal to do so, and where parental 
support and finance constitutes a large portion of school funds and can hold schools 
accountable as a result. 
 
Semi-private public schools are able to draw on the best of both systems by 
leveraging their state allocations against reputations of academic and extramural 
excellence and corresponding social capital (Pedro, Leroux & Watanabe, 2015). In 
this way it works in the interests of parents and interested parties to maintain their 
status through charging high fees, which also acts as a form of gatekeeping but also 
provides these schools with more security and resistance to fluctuations than poorer 
schools (Lewis & Motala, 2004). Moreover, while policies such as the SASA (1996) 
set limitations on the ability of schools to discriminate through admissions, language 
and catchment area policies, there is still scope for these schools to attract high-
performing and affluent learners and retain exclusivity on the grounds of academic 
excellence, which continues to be associated with the colonial education model (Ball 
& Youdell, 2008; Fiske & Ladd, 2003).  
 
Arguably while greater autonomy for these schools keeps wealthier learners in the 
public education system it does not remedy the inequalities that exist between 
schools or offer learners from low-income backgrounds sufficient opportunity to 
access high-quality schooling. As Lewis and Motala (2004) argue, the assumption 
that decentralisation would enable schools to attract direct funding from their 
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communities was undercut by the level of stratification in the inherited education 
system. In this context it is questionable whether the insertion of low- or mid-fee 
private education in the market would have the effect of reversing or remedying 
these inequities. It is important to interrogate whether autonomising good 
performance at the level of individual schools in such a deeply unequal context is 
sufficient for ensuring systemic resolution of inequities. Interventions such as public 
management of private schools have been touted in the South African context as a 
means to resolving this continued inequality, but the justification for this proposal 
requires sustainable evidence of its ability to deliver on its promise. Due to limited 
education budgets, the classic motivators for private intervention are there: greater 
risk-sharing, increased efficiency, enhanced flexibility and accountability through 
managerial mechanisms that bypass state regulation on employment and 
procurement for traditional public schools (Brans, 2013; Verger et al, 2016). The 
following discussion engages the South African case alongside a similar 
management model in Liberia, drawing out the ‘final frontier’ of private intervention in 
education – the public-private partnership. 
 
4.9. Public-private partnerships 
Private management of public schools, it is argued, can respond to the 
equity/efficiency trade-off that results from privatisation of public goods because they 
incorporate market principles while usually remaining under the authority of the state. 
this review positions this as the key form of PPP that is being promoted in current 
education reform in the global South, where public and private are no longer viewed 
as distinct (even if they are not), but through contractual agreements become fully 
entangled. This section will discuss two cases in South Africa and Liberia where 
private management is currently being piloted as a solution to struggling schools. 
 
LaRocque (2008) explains the process by which private bodies (such as NGOs or 
management firms) are brought in to run school operations: ‘Contracts contain basic 
requirements that apply to private schools but also outline expected student 
outcomes, methods for assessing those outcomes, the goals of the school, and its 
programme of instruction. The contract also covers the agreed or mandated 
curriculum. As part of the contract, the management company or organisation is 
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generally required to meet specific benchmarks in areas such as school attendance, 
student performance and community involvement’ (LaRocque, 2008:13) 
 
Contracts further include tenure periods for providers under which their performance 
may be reviewed and poor-performing providers replaced (LaRocque, 2008). 
LaRocque (2008) describes several country cases of private managerial or 
operational contracts in public schools, with some evidence suggesting longer tenure 
periods are more desirable to ensure sustained intervention and more sound 
performance evaluation. In a similar manner to the way high staff turnover can affect 
learning returns in schools, turnover in management arrangements can disrupt the 
running of institutions and the success of new interventions. Privately managed 
schools are also often able to have more flexibility in terms of governance, such as 
hiring and firing teachers or paying teacher salaries and setting incentives. This 
challenges traditionally unionised teacher forces by reducing job security and 
contracting in teachers with less experience at lower salaries. 
 
Fine and Hall (2012) caution against what they call the ‘evaluatory trap’ inherent in 
public-private partnership contracts. They argue that the imperative to evaluate and 
monitor progress and performance of private providers inevitably throws up 
shortcomings in outcomes that were not provided for or considered as part of the 
original agreements (Fine & Hall, 2012). Romero, Sandefur and Sandholtz (2017) in 
their discussion of the Liberian case agree with this perspective, suggesting pace 
Fine and Hall (2012) that the onus of regulation, amendment and ‘mopping up’ 
where private interventions have not fulfilled their mandate then falls on the state – 
which entered into these agreements specifically to avoid additional costs. 
 
4.9.1. South Africa 
In South Africa, private management is currently being piloted through the Public 
School Partnerships (colloquially known as ‘Collaboration Schools’) by the Western 
Cape government, in partnership with the DG Murray Trust. The partnerships were 
inspired by the Academy schools in the United Kingdom and the links established 
between public schools, donors and non-profit collaborators or operating partners. 
The pilot focuses on the ‘most poor’, no-fee quintile 1 and 2 schools based on the 
argument that low-cost private schooling can respond to some of the shortfalls of the 
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market but cannot target the least resourced (DG Murray Trust, 2017). The Trust 
argues that in the context of increasing educational inequalities, greater quality and 
attainment in public education should be the end-goal; moreover that expansion of 
the independent school sector will worsen inequalities as public schools come to be 
seen as schools ‘where poor kids go’ (DG Murray Trust, 2017). The proposed 
solution is for the state to retain ownership of schools but enter into contracts with 
private providers (called ‘School Operating Partners’) to manage school operations. 
 
Under the PSP model, partnership schools receive their regular state allocation but 
this is handed over to the managing company to direct funds. The Trust argues that 
parents can ‘opt in’ to turn their schools into partnership schools, but in return the 
SOP retains a significant proportion of voting capacity on the school governing body 
(50% or more) (DG Murray Trust, 2017). Contracting is performance-based to 
ensure that providers deliver on a minimum set of outcomes during their tenure. In 
return schools can expect greater support and efficiency through dedicated 
operational networks and improved social capital through connections to private 
finance. Indeed, the funding composition of these schools is intended to shift from an 
80/20 mix of public and donor funds respectively, to an 80% public funding, 20% mix 
of donor and ‘social capital’ funds accessed through fundraising and, potentially, the 
introduction of contributions from parents (DG Murray Trust, 2017). While the pilot is 
currently underway in five schools there are plans for it to be rolled out in more public 
schools if successful – what the Trust describes as ’10-15% of public schools, 
serving the poorest 40% of learners’ (DG Murray Trust, 2017).  
 
In response to criticisms of teacher casualization, marketization of schooling and 
long-term implications for school operation, the Trust argued that the SOP is 
required to conform to post-provisioning norms and is accountable to government for 
its performance. Moreover, issues of tenure length and ensuring sustainability in 
management forms part of the information-gathering process of the pilot. Alongside 
vouchers, which learners receive from the state to subsidise their education and 
exercise school choice, private management of schools is a common PPP form in 
both developing and developed countries (Languille, 2017). Vouchers have also 
been proposed as part of the education strategy of the Democratic Alliance, the 
ruling party in the Western Cape and several key metropolitans in the country 
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(Sayed et al, forthcoming). This indicates an increasing shift towards private 
involvement in the provision of public education alongside the expansion of the 
private education market (albeit from a small base, as argued by the CDE (2015)). 
 
These interventions follow the logic that greater choice and individual autonomy in 
the education sector will lead to higher demand for quality through increasing 
competition, and thus standards, between schools (Languille, 2017). Results on their 
success in practice have been mixed, with some suggesting improvements in access 
and others arguing that they introduce greater stratification into already unequal 
markets (LaRocque, 2008; OECD, 2012; CDE, 2015). In the case of vouchers, it is 
argued that these are more cost-efficient than funding public schools and offer more 
learners access to education (CDE, 2015). For arrangements such as the PSPs, the 
greater authority granted to the SOP may reproduce the unequal power relationship 
between parents and principals at poor schools (Lewis & Motala, 2004) because of 
the SOP’s role as managing partner and conduit to additional funds and support from 
donors.  
 
Further, as Srivastava (2016) and Languille (2017) argue, private managers may be 
more inclined towards systems standardisation across their partnered schools for 
efficiency purposes, resulting in less risk-taking and decreased responsiveness to 
local needs. Relationships of accountability are also not clearly defined as SOPs are 
accountable both to the contracting party (government) and parents as proxies of 
learners. Performance is reviewed by government and while parents and other 
governing body members have some power to remove the SOP, arguably this power 
is constrained by fears of resource withdrawal and support. This asymmetry between 
donor authority and constituent agency is important to bear in mind. 
 
4.9.2. Liberia  
Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in the foreword to Caerus Capital’s (20117) 
The Business of Education in Africa states that: ‘Of course, [the] distinction between 
public and private shouldn’t matter; a school’s outcomes should’. She argues that 
‘creative and pragmatic’ solutions are needed to rebuild public institutions ravaged 
by years of conflict and violence, and restore hope through educational possibilities 
(Caerus Capital, 2017).  
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The Liberia case shares some similarities and some differences with that of South 
Africa. For one, the state retains ownership of the school but devolves management 
processes to the private contractor. In Liberia providers involved in the pilot were 
contracted in through an open tender process with the exception of Bridge 
International Academies (BIA) which entered into a separate, and undisclosed, 
memorandum of understanding with the state. BIA is still considered a part of the 
Partnership Schools for Liberia (PSL) programme which is currently in its second 
year of piloting. In both countries, private providers range from multinational 
companies to non-government and/or non-profit organisations. 
Romero, Sandefur and Sandholtz (2017) offer the first results of the PSL pilot in their 
working paper released September 2017, as part of a three-year randomised 
evaluation. The Liberian pilot delegates management of 93 public schools to eight 
contractors under condition that teachers remain employees of the state, schools are 
fee-free and while there is a cap instituted on class size in participant schools, 
admissions screening is prohibited (Romero et al, 2017:2). This mirrors the 
limitations set on South Africa’s PSPs. However an exception is that while public 
low-income schools can opt into the PSP pilot, and are described as of the more 
disadvantaged segment of the schools in the province, in Liberia participant schools 
were of above-average quality. This meant that they had higher enrolments, were 
closer to urban areas, and had somewhat better resources, infrastructure and 
teacher capacity (Romero et al, 2017). As such they caution that the current pilot has 
not been tested in ordinary public schools in the country where it may incur greater 
start-up costs and require coordinated intervention into teacher capacity and learning 
attainment. 
 
Teacher capacity is important to the PSLs because a special arrangement exists 
with the Liberian government to rid pilot schools of underperforming teachers as well 
as direct highly-sought graduate teachers into them. The result is that teachers in 
PSLs are of a higher standard, better trained and scored higher in attendance and 
actual teaching (Romero et al, 2017). The hidden cost is that weaker teachers are 
pushed out of these schools and either back into the public sector – becoming a 
negative externality there – or out of the system entirely. This has the potential for a 
long-term crisis in teacher numbers if current graduate rates do not match PSL-
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related attrition (as the programme expands) and if there are insufficient professional 
development mechanisms to improve existing capacity in the system. The results of 
the preliminary evaluation suggest that ‘the staffing advantages given to PSL appear 
unsustainable at a larger scale’ (Romero et al, 2017:3). 
 
Private providers are granted a per-pupil subsidy of $50 additional to the $50 already 
spent per learner in Liberia which largely covers teacher salaries and resources 
(Romero et al, 2017). This results in a total spend of $100 per learner in PSLs. 
Liberia draws a significant share of its education expenditure from foreign aid and 
not domestic tax revenue, and there are also streams of capital that bypass the state 
and are administered directly by NGOs running particular programmes within the 
education system (Romero et al, 2017). It was found that many of the contractors 
received additional remittances from other sources which increased the cost per 
learner significantly: for one organisation (YMCA) an additional spend of $57 per 
learner, for another (BIA) an additional spend of $1,050 (Romero et al, 2017:17). The 
additional subsidy is used at the discretion of the management team, as are funds 
from external sources though these may come with their own conditions attached. 
 
In the short term the PSL has been shown to improve learning attainment 
(amounting to an extra 0.56 years of literacy education and 0.66 years of 
mathematics), teacher practice and enrolment (Romero et al, 2017). However 
enrolments have decreased in some PSLs where the ‘capping’ of class sizes results 
in excess learners being pushed off into the public sector in much the same fashion 
as underperforming teachers. As the authors argue, improving learning gains for a 
subset of learners is insufficient for boosting enrolment and access, or for ensuring 
equity in the cohort of learners that are enrolled in PSL. For example they find no 
change in the number of learners with physical and cognitive challenges in PSL 
schools. They also problematize the tendency to pilot programmes such as PSL in 
better schools, push weaker teachers out into poorer segments of the public sector, 
and prioritise learning for a nucleated selection of learners under the assumption that 
this will result in greater systemic gains (Romero et al, 2017). The promise of ‘free’ 
schooling for the poor is also problematic at closer inspection where in both 
countries hidden costs are imposed on parents regardless of formal fees being 
scrapped. An unseen effect of this in the long-term is that PSL (and arguably, the 
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PSPs) will crowd in resources from the state and donors and become enclaves of 
good performance, enabling de facto screening processes to cream off good 
learners from weaker public schools. 
 
These cases show similarities in the intended outcomes of private management, 
avenues for revenue within these management agreements and unintended or –
expected effects of these initiatives on the public sector. While it remains to be seen 
whether either the PSPs or PSL enjoy success on a systemic level, early indications 
from both programmes suggest that deep understanding is needed of the social and 
economic repercussions of devolving school management to private providers 
without strong ties to local communities, and with insufficient oversight mechanisms 
to ensure that providers’ aims and practices align with national goals. If this form of 
PPP is to be established as the blueprint for future education reforms in the global 
South, its legitimacy, benefits, and externalities require further interrogation. 
 
4.10. Conclusion: Emerging analytical and research agendas 
The discussion in this literature review has pointed to the complex landscape of 
private intervention in education in the global South, with particular focus on South 
Africa and more broadly in Africa. It has identified a number of ways in which private 
actors intervene in the delivery of basic education, from provision of technology and 
resources to niche schooling, low-cost schooling and public-private partnerships for 
school reform. 
 
A few important, cross-cutting analytical threads emerged from this review that 
merit attention. These are: 
 
4.10.1. Decentralisation and accountability 
The ‘accountability turn’ has been a critical outcome of the current global 
privatisation agenda (Verger & Altinyelken, 2013), which positions accountability and 
standards-setting as an important element of ensuring quality education delivery and 
governance of education systems. As the discussion in the beginning of this section 
noted, decentralisation takes a number of forms and is usually motivated by 
‘democratic participation’ and decision-making, based on the argument that greater 
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ownership of schools by local communities leads to better outcomes and more 
relevant learning. However, the question of ‘who’ in the accountability debate is 
important. Some of the interventions discussed in this review have shown that new 
lines of accountability have been configured between governments and private 
providers that in fact erodes the bottom-up line of accountability schools, teachers, 
parents and learners have to the sources of education management and funding 
(Ball & Youdell, 2008; Verger et al, 2016). Furthermore, the capacity of governments 
to hold private providers accountable is also questionable, requiring firm division of 
responsibility and indicators of performance. Accountability measures in new forms 
of managerialism adopted from the private sector rely on indicators such as 
evaluation of schools and teachers, learner test scores, and national benchmarking, 
rather than more holistic indicators of quality performance and system-wide 
improvement (Ball & Youdell, 2008). 
 
4.10.2. The role of teachers 
The accountability debate also relates strongly to the work of teachers, who are 
positioned as key inputs to the delivery of quality education outcomes (Ball & 
Youdell, 2008). Teachers have further also been located as a problem in struggling 
education systems, and the unionisation of their work flagged by private providers as 
a key constraint to deregulating the education system and freeing up resources due 
to the high cost of their salaries (Verger et al, 2016). Private providers argue that 
introducing performance-related pay will stimulate teachers to work harder at 
delivering high outcomes, while more flexible hiring conditions (teacher 
casualization) will enable greater accountability (Barrera-Osorio et al, 2012). It is 
noteworthy that in the literature on privatisation, scholars such as Tooley emphasise 
the quality of teaching as a driver of the development of the low-fee private schools, 
but rarely engage the labour, equity and regulatory concerns inherent in an informal 
model of education delivery. 
 
The professional status of teachers has been significantly challenged by new 
reforms and resources, particularly the use of ICTs which displace their central role 
in the classroom. Here, the teacher is situated as a technician or facilitator, in a 
similar manner to where they are expected to rely on structured curricula and lesson 
plans (Verger & Altinyelken, 2013). While research has shown that many teachers in 
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low-fee private schools are un- or underqualified, it is also significant to note that 
many teachers in private school chains are also either less experienced or have the 
minimum qualifications required, factors which render their labour cheaper than 
experienced teachers (Verger et al, 2013). Verger and Altinyelken (2013), in the 
introduction to a book detailing how teacher labour is transformed under new 
managerialism, argue that the very construction of the teaching profession is 
currently facing a paradigm shift as governments take on prescriptions of value from 
the private sector – where standards come to determine the measurable nature of 
teachers’ work, and where evaluation is less for professional development and 
progress than it is for measuring how teachers are failing to produce learning 
outcomes. Altinyelken and Verger (2013) conclude that one outcome of 
problematizing teachers is the generation of greater antagonism between teachers 
and the state, and teachers and private providers (particularly where these are 
directly involved in public sector provision), which could lead to greater resistance, 
attrition, and reduced status of the profession in the long run. 
 
In contexts such as South Africa, where teacher quality still follows historic racial, 
gender and geographic lines, the use of standardised accountability measures 
threatens the professional status of many of the teachers working in the most 
challenging learning contexts. As research has shown in the past (OECD, 2012) a 
more complex array of factors are responsible for low attainment, and greater 
attention should be paid to the levels of equity between schools, communities and 
regions. 
 
4.10.3. Highlights and emerging research gaps 
Further to the cross-cutting issues above are a number of key highlights emerging 
from the literature, which relate to: 
 The question of inequality and how the existence of private education options 
at different ends of the income spectrum impacts the most vulnerable 
learners. 
 The importance of efficiency and autonomy in motivating the existence of 
private schools, low-cost private and privately managed public schools more 
specifically (especially private school ‘chains’) 
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 The transformation of the education system and participants within it, 
particularly the way the role of teachers is being reconfigured through new 
modes and spaces of teaching and learning 
 The view of education as a public good and how this is affected by the 
expansion of private options and ePPPs. This includes the impact of the 
private sector on state control over public education, the process of citizen 
development in schooling and the inculcation of particular values 
 The policy landscape enabling, impeding or mediating ePPPs and 
privatisation in education 
 
These issues above should also be framed with respect to gender, which emerged 
as an issue underlying much of the literature on low-cost schooling and challenges to 
access. Unterhalter (2017) argues that public support for girls’ education can either 
be bolstered or diluted by PPPs depending on their respect for contextual 
circumstances such as religion and domestic division of labour. She describes the 
relationship between private money and the public good as ‘dispersal’ for how this 
displaces old distinctions between left/right politics and the role of the state in 
different political contexts (Unterhalter, 2017), and in so doing leads to 
unpredictability in the projected and unexpected outcomes of PPPs. It is further 
possible to differentiate between PPPs concerned with ‘soft’ approaches to gender 
equality, such as through increasing access for girls, and those concerned with 
mobilising around girls’ education as a driver of equity and long-term changes to 
gender dynamics.  
 
Further, in contexts marked by conflict, social tension and fragmentation and/or 
religious fundamentalism, education and health can work in tandem to produce or 
disrupt inequalities. The feminisation of care (Gideon et al, 2017) and confinement of 
girls to domestic spaces has direct implications for access to education and the 
choices made by parents to educate their children (such as sending boys to better 
private schools, and girls to weak public schools) (Fennell, 2014; Languille 2016, 
2017; Unterhalter, 2017). The discussion above has described the range of 
interventions that exist in the relationship between public and private, and it is crucial 
to understand how gender inequities fit into this education provision. If expanding 
access and improving outcomes is the major driver of increased private involvement 
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in education, then the repercussions of this for long-term gains in generating gender 
equality are a necessary site of interrogation. Unterhalter and North (2011) indeed 
question whether global frameworks adequately distil feminist concerns and actions, 
and whether measures and indicators limit the feasibility of these frameworks for 
realising substantive equality. There are implications for leaving behind less 
measurable indicators as these come to threaten the durability of the gains that are 
made. 
 
The discussion above also crucially asks what the key research gaps are emerging 
from the work of this literature review. Several can be identified at this juncture: 
i. The epistemic silencing of local voices in the privatisation debate save for the 
work of international advocacy organisations such as Education International 
which have conducted critical empirical work across the global South. The 
intellectual gatekeeping of Northern ‘knowledge economies’ continues to set 
the agenda for discussion on the issue of privatisation and related 
phenomena, such that while there is significant work being done in the global 
South by for example feminist scholars, little of this finds its way into 
mainstream research into privatisation. Robertson (2006) refers to this as an 
absence of subaltern or alternative knowledges, which reaffirms Verger’s 
(2012) notion of the ‘cognitive locks’ that currently dominate the sphere of 
debate on privatisation. 
ii. The limited teacher focus of research into privatisation is a cause for concern. 
Focusing on schools and learners ignores that teachers are key brokers in the 
learning experience, making it important to interrogate how the profession is 
being transformed, how teaching and learning is being reconfigured, and what 
the future possibilities for equity and quality will be. 
iii. In her discussion of ‘three absences’ in current work on privatisation, 
Robertson (2006) notes a need for a deeper political economy analysis of 
privatisation and the entanglement of the state and private sector, as the 
terrain of representation in state politics becomes altered (and globalised), 
and the identities of citizen and consumer come into contestation. While the 
article by Robertson is over a decade old at the time of this review, the 
absences she articulates remain relevant to current writing on privatisation. 
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iv. Research also needs to take up and map the genealogy of policy borrowing 
(Ball & Youdell, 2008) that occurs between the global North and South, 
between international policy agendas and regional development imperatives. 
It is critical to understand the flow of information, knowledge and agenda-
setting that drives the turn towards privatisation in different states, and show 
how national education systems are becoming cross-referential in their 
modes, mechanisms and frameworks. 
v. A major focus of pro-privatisation literature has been on showing how the 
public education system is failing in its mandate, and a necessary avenue for 
researchers is to do informed quantitative and qualitative work on whether the 
private alternative is really as good as it is proposed to be. This entails shifting 
the gaze of new managerialism’s focus on outcomes, evaluation and 
accountability back to the private sector, and measuring the outcomes of 
private sector interventions, levels of democratic accountability and 
engagement with constituents and funders, and the quality of practice in 
private and privately-managed schools. If privatisation is the ‘new paradigm’ 
as its proponents argue, it is necessary for critical scholarship to interrogate 
whether this is truly an ideal solution to the very pressing problems of 
inequality and social fragmentation that education is expected to engage 
(UNESCO, 2015). 
vi. Finally, similar to the network analyses that have been conducted of public-
private relationships in education provision in the global North, mapping the 
networks of capital that currently operate in education provision in the global 
South is important: it shows where investment comes from and which entities 
are able to exert influence on public education systems and education 
policymaking. It also crucially shows the intersection of interests between 
states and private entities across the world: Bridge International Academies, 
for example, operate in a number of countries and have vested interests in 
education and service provision in others. The brother of the current President 
of South Africa was recently appointed to the board of Curro Holdings. Very 
often private sector engagement with the public is shrouded in secrecy, as in 
the case of Liberia’s confidential MOU with BIA as the 9th provider in its PSL 
pilot – and the reality is that we may never get a full picture of what goes on in 
these agreements. But it is important to start developing a picture of the 
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networks that are invested in the private sector’s entry into public service 
provision, as it is evident that these networks cut across different services, 
states, and spheres of influence. 
 
The distance of global development agendas from local circumstances and 
dynamics should be a central point of departure for research into PPPs in the global 
South. The introduction of new players, rules, risks and rewards in the interplay 
between public and private also reframes conceptions of local and global. Here 
dispersal and entanglement come to work together, unpredictably and unstably, to 
influence the ways in which private sector motivation and intervention collides with 
the normativities and responsibilities of statehood. The maxim ‘the public in the 
private, the private in the public’ becomes not cliché but an indication of interstices 
that exist in our understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
This review has provided an account of the conceptual underpinnings of the 
involvement of the private sector in education and its diverse forms and types. The 
empirical literature we have reviewed has focused on private sector engagement, 
including PPPs, in education and health in Africa with a particular focus on South 
Africa.  
 
The review of literature on PPPs in healthcare finds that there are three critical 
knowledge gaps. First, relatively little is known about the endogenous dynamics of 
PPPs; this includes their financial scale and drivers, as well as their implications for 
public health financing and national debt. Second, there is insufficient information 
about the expansion of southern healthcare companies into the global North. The 
dynamics and consequences of such southern expansion remain under-explored, 
particularly with regard to the ways in which state support for such expansion 
constitutes a de facto form of industrial policy. Understanding why this form of 
industrial policy has succeeded in enabling the expansion of an infant industry, vis-à-
vis the failure of industrial policy in manufacturing, is an important and hitherto 
unexplored empirical project. Third, while PPPs are typically conceptualised as an 
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attempt to bring the logic of the market into public goods provision, there are clear 
examples of PPPs that have a countervailing logic. The proposed National Health 
Insurance (NHI) scheme in South Africa aims to decommodify healthcare by bringing 
the private sector back into the ambit of the public. The existential risk that this poses 
to the private health sector has catalysed significant contestation over the NHI, and it 
is therefore important to understand the ways in which the NHI has structured 
tensions between the state and the private sector, the mechanisms available for 
disciplining the private sector, and the constraints on the state’s attempt to do so. 
 
Following the final point of the above paragraph, the section on education PPPs 
shows a reverse trend, namely that while the stratification of education and schooling 
by funding, management and learner cohort has resulted from both top-down and 
bottom-up drivers, the solution has by and large been to encourage more and not 
less private sector intervention. An example is the Collaboration Schools model, 
which does not take as its starting point the inequality of the education landscape in 
South Africa but the cohort of poorly performing quintile 1 to 3 schools. This is 
evident of an approach that treats the symptom and not the systemic problem, and 
serves as a major research gap where studies require greater exposition on the 
nature of the education system of a particular country as a whole, and not only on 
the ‘market’ affected by privatisation. Further research gaps identified included an 
analysis of how private schools fare compared to the private sector, given that they 
are touted as a solution to failing public schools; the implications of privatisation in 
education for gender and the provision of education for girls; and the influence of 
new technologies on the learning experience and creation of new markets for digital 
consumption. 
 
These findings show that there is empirical and theoretical value in paying serious 
attention to southern scholarship on PPPs. On the one hand, it helps to remove 
some of the strong normative framing around PPPs, by showing that they may be 
used to deepen the marketisation of public goods, but can also be used for 
countervailing ends – the decommodification of healthcare. At the same time, the 
review brings theoretical and empirical attention to the endogenous drivers of PPPs, 
and thereby helps reframe the discourse away from an over-emphasis on northern 
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agency to include southern dynamics. It is hoped that this helps galvanise greater 
attention to southern scholarship. 
 
In this review we have identified a particular dominant hegemonic discourse that 
shapes the debate about the private sector in general and PPPs in particular. We 
have pointed to the ideological underpinnings of the debate about private sector 
involvement in public goods. We argue for an empirically grounded, nuanced, and 
decolonised account of PPPs in education and health by scholars in and from the 
Global South and which protects and promotes social citizenship, and equity. 
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